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INTRODUCTION 
An important current trend within the theories and practices 
of psychotherapy is the reconciliation between the cognitive and be­
havioral psychologies. Neither of these schools of thought are 
particularly recent additions to the literature of psychopathology 
or personality. One example of a cognitive theorist is Rokeach 
(195b; 1960; 1964), who in his investigations of authoritarianism and 
dogmatism dealt with the formal properties of belief systems. An 
individual's primitive or core beliefs, according to Rokeach (1960), 
are said to "develop early in life, are generally unquestioned, and 
are responsible for the sense of personal identity and stability 
that the person has about himself and the physical and social world" 
(Levy, 1970, p. 272). An example of a cognitive approach of pos­
sibly greater theoretical importance than Rokeach's, is that of 
George Kelly. Kelly (1955) conceives of people as scientists, con­
stantly trying to predict and explain their environment as perfectly 
as possible. The tools that Kelly postulates are used for predic­
tions and explanations are individualized, hierarchical, personal 
construct repertoires. A cognitive point of view that is rather 
different from either of the above is that of Classer's (1965) 
reality therapy, which emphasizes the importance of values and 
responsibility. For all cognitive approaches, the concept of cog­
nitive content is important, and has been described in terms of the 
idea of "self" (e.g., Murphy, 1947; Maslow, 1954) going all the way 
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back (in American psychology) to William James (1890). 
Behavior modification has also been written about and employed 
for a number of years (e.g., Watson & Rayner, 1920; Jones, 1924). 
The concepts of positive and negative reinforcement, extinction, 
and counterconditioning have become part of the everyday vocabulary 
of many personality theorists and clinicians. Behaviorists are no 
longer viewed as belonging to a totally different approach from 
psychoanalysts, existential therapists, cognitively oriented thera­
pists, etc. In fact, a clear trend has emerged whereby the princi­
ples and mechanisms of behavior modification are being used in con­
junction with a variety of other techniques, some of which have a 
philosophical basis rather alien to the radical behaviorism (e.g.. 
Skinner, 1953; 1955-6; 1957; 1963) from which they emerged. This 
blending of techniques and therapies has been greatly facilitated 
by the work of researchers in the area of social learning, such as 
Bandura (1968; 1969) and Rotter (1954; 1960; 1966), and by such in­
fluential cognitive theorists as Miller, Galanter, and Pribram (1960). 
Consequently, many psychologists have shifted their theoretical posi­
tions. For example, Lazarus (1971) now includes a variety of cog­
nitive factors in his broad-spectruîTi behaviorism; Thoresen (1973; 
Thoresen & Mahoney, 1974) attempts to use the technology of behavior 
modification in pursuit of goals typically identified with "humanis­
tic" psychology; Mischel (1973) now refers to "cognitive social 
learning;" and Mowrer (1967) emphasizes the relevance of values and 
responsibility. BoTl»;ers (1973) may be beating a rather dead horse in 
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his recent critique of "situationism," in that the S-R psychology 
that he so effectively dismembers has already been expanded and 
modified to include many of the "biocognitive" (Bowers, 1973, p. 314) 
factors that he discusses (e.g., Mischel, 1973). 
A current school of thought that has integrated cognitive and 
behavioral principles, and which makes considerable use of philosophy 
as well, is the rational-emotive, or A-B-C theory of personality and 
behavior change postulated by Albert Ellis (1957, 1958; 1962, 1971; 
1973a; 1973b; Ellis & Harper, 1961). One premise of Ellis' (1962) 
position is that people have free will; they are not predestined to 
act in any previously determined manner, nor are they prisoners of 
their own past experiences or habits. Instead, they may influence 
(given certain physical and environmental restrictions) their own 
lives, their own present, and their own futures. Ellis (1962) pro­
poses that the irrational beliefs that people hold are directly 
related to their maladaptive behaviors and unhappiness. In other 
words, it is not the precipitating event—"A"—which causes an emo­
tional disturbance—"C"—, but rather it is what the individual be­
lieves and tells oneself about that event --"B"— that directly 
leads to the extreme emotional reaction. In order to help clients 
give up their irrational beliefs, Ellis employs teaching, arguing? 
behavior modification, homework assignments, and anything else 
1 that might work (Ellis, personal communication ). The recent trend 
^RET workshop at Iowa State University in October, 1973. 
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of the cognitive and behavioral schools embracing each other more 
openly has evidenced itself in the writings of Ellis (e.g., 1973b) 
and by other proponents of this viewpoint, who have even begun to 
refer to their position as rational-behavior therapy (e.g., Maultsby, 
Stiefel, & Brodsky, 1972). Ellis' use of learning theory, behavior­
ism , and even his general eclecticism, can be observed consistently 
in a variety of his publications (e.g., 1958; 1962; 1973b). It is 
the purpose of rational-emotive therapy (RET) to get people to ques­
tion their irrational beliefs and assumptions, and at the saune time 
to have them learn to behave more adaptively, thereby obtaining last­
ing behavior change. Both cognitive and behavioral principles, then, 
are used to change both cognitive and behavioral factors. 
What precisely are these "fundamentally unsound, irrational 
ideas" (Ellis, 1958, p. 43) that lead to neuroticism and to people 
being "inhibited^ hostile, defensive, guilty, anxious, inert, un­
controlled, or unhappy" (Ellis, 1958, p. 42)? In one of his earlier 
publications, Ellis (1958) lists these twelve postulates: 
1. The idea that it is a dire necessity for an adult 
to be loved or approved by everyone for everything 
he does—instead of his concentrating on his own 
self-respect, on winning approval for necessary pur­
poses (such as job advancement), and on loving rather 
than being loved. 
2. The idea that certain acts are wrong, or wicked, or 
villainous, and that people who perform such acts 
should be severely punished—instead of the idea 
that people who perform such acts are invariably 
stupid, ignorant, or emotionally disturbed. 
3. The idea that it is terrible, horrible, and catas­
trophic when things are not the way one would like 
them to be—instead of the idea that it is too bad 
when things are not the way one would like them to 
be, and one should certainly try to change or control 
conditions so that they become more satisfactory, but 
that if changing or controlling uncomfortable situa­
tions is impossible, one had better become resigned 
to their existence and stop telling oneself how awful 
they are. 
4. The idea that much human unhappiness is externally 
caused and is forced on one by outside people and 
events—instead of the idea that virtually all human 
unhappiness is caused or sustained by the view one 
takes of things rather than the things themselves. 
5. The idea that if something is or may be dangerous or 
fearsome one should be terribly concerned about it— 
instead of the idea that if something is or may be 
dangerous or fearsome one should frankly face it and 
try to render it non-dangerous and, when that is im­
possible, think of other things and stop telling oneself 
what a terrible situation one is or may be in. 
t. The idea that it is easier to avoid than to face life 
difficulties and self-responsibilities—instead of the 
idea that the so-called easy way is invariably the much 
harder way in the long run and that the only way to 
solve difficult problems is to face them squarely. 
7. The idea that one needs something other or stronger 
or greater than oneself on which to rely—instead of 
the idea that it is usually far better to stand on 
one's own feet and gain faith in oneself and one's 
ability to meet difficult circumstances of living. 
8. The idea that one should be thoroughly competent, 
adequate, intelligent, and achieving in all possible 
respects—instead of the idea that one should ^  
rather than always try to do well and that one should 
accept oneself as a quite imperfect creature who has 
general human limitations and specific fallibilities» 
9. The idea that because something once strongly affected 
one's life, it should indefinitely affect it—instead 
of the idea that one should learn from one's past ex­
periences but not be overtly-attached to or prejudiced 
by them. 
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10. The idea that it is vitally important to our ex­
istence what other people do, and that we should make 
great efforts to change them in the direction we would 
like them to be—instead of the idea that other peo­
ple's deficiencies are largely their problems and that 
putting pressure on them to change is usually least 
likely to help them to do so. 
11. The idea that human happiness can be achieved by 
inertia and inaction—instead of the idea that humans 
tend to be happiest when they are actively and vitally 
absorbed in creative pursuits, or when they are devot­
ing themselves to people or projects outside themselves. 
12. The idea that one has virtually no control over one's 
emotions and that one cannot help feel certain things— 
instead of the idea that one has enormous control over 
one's emotions if one chooses to work at controlling 
them and to practice saying the right kind of sentences 
to oneself (pp. 40-41). 
In a later, and more widely acknowledged publication, Ellis (1962) 
again gives a listing of important irrational beliefs, this time 
in a far briefer fashion, and with the noticeable omission of the 
eleventh idea listed above. They include the following: 
1. The idea that it is a dire necessity for an adult 
human being to be loved or approved by virtually 
every significant other person in his community. 
2. The idea that one should be thoroughly competent, 
adequate, and achieving in all possible respects if 
one is to consider oneself worthwhile. 
3. The idea that certain people are bad, wicked, or 
villainous and that they should be severely blamed or 
punished for their villainy. 
4. The idea that it is awful and catastrophic when 
things are not the way one would very much like 
them to be. 
5. The idea that human unhappiness is externally 
caused and that people have little or no ability to 
control their sorrows and disturbances. 
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b. The idea that if something is or may be dangerous or 
fearsome one should be terribly concerned about it 
and should keep dwelling on the possibility of its 
occurring. 
7. The idea that it is easier to avoid than to face 
certain life difficulties and self-responsibilities. 
8. The idea that one should be dependent on others 
and need someone stronger than onesëlf on whom to 
rely. 
9. The idea that one's past history is an all-important 
determiner of one's present behavior and that be­
cause something once strongly affected one's life, it 
should indefinitely have a similar effect. 
10. The idea that one should become quite upset over 
other people's problems and disturbances. 
11. The idea that there is invariably a right, precise, 
and perfect solution to human problems and that it is 
catastrophic if this perfect solution is not found 
(pp. 61-87). 
Despite the minor inconsistencies of language in the two listings, 
together they provide a fairly clear picture of what Ellis means 
by irrational ideas. As Ellis (1962), himself, states, "these 
ideas may be classified in various ways, so that the ... listing 
is not meant to be definitive or non-overlapping, but constitutes 
one of several classificatory approaches which may be taken to 
modern irrationalities" (p. 61). 
Although Ellis (1962) claims that he has discovered the prin­
ciples of RET "independently (and that they are) constructed from 
my recent experience with patients" (p. 35), he does list several 
important influences. These range from such historical sources as 
Greek and Roman Stoic Philosophers, such as Epictetus and Marcus 
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Aurelius, and ancient Taoist and Buddhist thinkers, to psychologists 
as diverse as Adler (1927), Homey (1939), Fromm (1941), Reich 
(1949), Dollard and Miller (1950), Rotter (1954), Kelly (1955), 
Wolpe (1958), and Eysenck (1961). 
One major premise of RET that can be observed in several of 
the influences listed above, as well as in the irrational ideas 
cited earlier, is that there are no absolute standards or methods 
of divining how people should behave, and that belief in irrational 
absolutes of this type leads to a great deal of what is typically 
labeled as maladjustment, neurosis, or psychosis (Ellis & Harper, 
1961), Ellis (1962) does not advocate that a person "think" more 
and "feel" less, but instead proposes that people question the 
irrational statements and beliefs that they tell themselves at 
"B." Then rational thinking could pave the way for less extreme 
emotional upsets, and more useful and efficient behaviors could be 
performed. 
In Ellis' (Ellis & Harper, 1961) schema, a rational emotional 
reaction is one that is motivating, and energizes the individual 
into performing a behavior that is useful (i.e., removing a stress­
ful stimulus, or coming into more contact with a pleasant stimulus). 
An irrational emotional reaction, on the other hand, is immobilizing, 
and keeps the person worrying and feeling sad, unworthy, anxious, 
or crazy. This latter type of reaction, of course, is not very 
compatible with doing something that might lead to more pleasing 
consequences. Ellis is not saying that his system will eliminate 
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feelings, do away with unhappiness, or totally remove anxiety, anger, 
depression, and feelings of unworthiness; he is saying that un­
pleasant feelings (with the exception of torture, and other forms of 
physical pain) don't have to last for extended periods of time, and 
that people can rationally choose to stop them and do something to 
feel better. It is their irrational belief systems, and what people 
tell themselves about what has happened, what will happen, or what 
should happen that lead to severe emotional upsets. 
The supposition that irrational beliefs and emotional upsets 
are related is an obvious issue for researchers interested in RET. 
However, for any of Ellis' ideas concerning the relationship between 
irrationality and maladjustment to be tested, it is necessary first 
to have an adequate measure of irrationality. Fortunately, there 
have been some attempts to construct irrationality instruments. 
Measures have been devised by Argabrite and Nidorf (1968), Bard 
(1973), Fox and Davies (1971), Gustav (1968), Hartman (1968), Jones 
(1968), MacDonald and Games (1972), and Zingle (1965). Several of 
the above scales, however, have no reliability or validity data 
(e.g., Bard, 1973), some apparently are confounded with social 
desirability (e.g.. Fox & Davies, 1971), and at least two have 
formats that make administration on a large scale impractical (e.g., 
Gustav, 1968). The most promising instruments for any investigation 
into RET concepts, based upon their reliability and validity data, 
include the scales of Jones (1968), Hartman (1968), and MacDonald 
and Games (1972), This will be more clearly illustrated in the 
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detailed review of irrationality instruments that follows. The 
primary concern of the remainder of this paper will be the measure­
ment of irrationality; how it has been previously attempted, and 
what methods are most likely to be accurate in the future. When ef­
fective irrationality instruments are available, important theoretical 
and applied research concerning RET can take place. 
Review of Irrationality Instruments 
This section is based on a comprehensive review of the RET 
literature. The major source for research in this area is the 
of 
the Institute for Rational Living, founded by Albert Ellis. In 
evaluating irrationality instruments, particular attention will be 
devoted to methods of test construction and to reliability and 
validity data. 
Argabrite and Nidorf (1968). administered their fifteen item 
scale to 204 students in an introductory psychology class. The 
wording of the items was based on the writings of Albert Ellis and 
paraphrasings by Lynn (1966) and Gullo (1966). Each item consists 
of two extreme statements and three blank intermediate answers, 
giving a total range of five possible ansvjers for each of the 
fifteen questions. Rational statement responses are scored "1," 
and extreme irrational statements are scored "5," with intermediate 
responses scored 2, 3, or 4. Thus 15 is the lowest (most rational) 
possible score, and 75 is the highest (most irrational) possible 
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score. The average total sc-.orc of the class was 35.54 and the 
standard deviation was 5.6b. Although responses to individual 
questions did not fall into perfectly normal distributions (the 
mean scores of all items were below 3.00), Argabrite and Nidorf 
(1968) explain this by arguing "that an average group of college 
students, such as our subjects, would be less neurotic than the 
general population" (p. 10) and that means of 3.00 would be expected 
only in the general population. Unfortunately, they cite no addi­
tional data to support this claim. In addition, although the authors 
report that "although this test tends to correlate positively with 
other, more traditional, tests of psychopathology in the main, the 
correlations are not particularly high" (p. 10). However, neither 
the correlations, nor tne samples that they were obtsined—fromr^are 
actually reported. The authors do assert that overt symptoms may 
not necessarily be associated with irrational beliefs, and support 
this with the psychoanalytic reasoning that irrational beliefs can 
be defense mechanisms which limit anxiety. Therefore, they would 
not be directly expressed in the form of symptoms. Without knowing 
what the "other" psychopathology measures Argabrite and Nidorf (1968) 
used, what the correlations were that they obtained, or the nature 
of the sample that these correlations were computed from, further 
speculation about their instrument does not appear worthwhile, es­
pecially after considering that several other instruments with more 
reliability and validity data are now available. 
Bard (1973) developed a self-rating scale for rationality 
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"designed to sample opinions on several issues which seem to be 
most germane to the RET view of people and their problems. The 
scale is a revision of the scale we have been using to measure 
attitude change as a function of psychological homework. All items 
were derived from the writings of Albert Ellis. ... It is there­
fore a 'valid' scale in that the founder and chief spokesman for 
RET has ruled on each of the items, i.e., either agreed or disagreed 
with them" (p. 19). The Bard scale consists of twenty statements 
to which responses ranging from +2 (strongly agree) to -2 (strongly 
disagree) are possible. No reliability data and no validity data 
(other than the administration of the scale to Albert Ellis) exists 
for this scale (Bard, personal communication, 1974). Its use, there­
fore, is ill-advised. 
In order to measure the rationality of underachievers in 
secondary school; Zingle (1965) constructed a 122 statement inven­
tory, with a five-point Likert-type response format, ranging from 
strongly agree, to undecided, to strongly disagree. The items were 
written with Ellis' (1962) eleven irrational beliefs in mind, with 
half of them being direct and half of them being inverse measures. 
In order to assess reliability, Zingle (19b5) administered his 
Irrationality Inventory (II) to ^ s from grades ten, eleven, and 
twelve, and then again, after a five week delay. A test-retest 
reliability coefficient of .80 was obtained. To determine validity, 
Zingle (1965) had three judges familiar with Ellis' writings rate 
each item as to which irrational belief it reflected. 
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Intercorrelations between the three judges and Zingle ranged from 
.75 to .85. To obtain evidence for construct validity, Zingle 
(1965) administered the II to bbO high school students "who were 
divided on the basis of discrepancy between scholastic capacity and 
achievement into three groups: overachievers, average achievers, 
and underachievers" (pp. 44-5). Zingle found that underachievers 
scored highest on irrationality, while the average achievers scored 
lowest, with each mean being significantly (p < .01) different from 
the other two. On the basis of these data, Zingle (1965) used the 
II in a study designed to see if counseling using RET would help 
underachievers. Zingle found that "underachieving students, coun­
seled according to the rational-emotive therapy approach showed 
significant decreases in (their) irrational beliefs and significant 
increases in academic achievement" (p. 54). Students who were treated 
in another manner, however, also showed a decrease in irrational 
beliefs, without a corresponding increase in performance. It is 
difficult to draw conclusions from these data because, as Zingle 
(1965) himself points out, "only limited evidence of validity was 
obtained" (p. 55) on the II. It does not appear at this time that 
the II has sufficient validity data to mandate its continued use. 
In addition, the fact that it has been utilized solely with high 
school students further limits its usefulness. 
The Adult Irrational Ideas Inventory (Fox & Davies, 1971), 
based on the Zingle (1965) instrument described above, was formed 
from many of the original items of the 11, with some revised, some 
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kept the same, and a few new items added. From a total pool of 
130 items, with a five-point Likert scale, choices ranging from 
"strongly agree" to "strongly disagree," 99 were selected, such 
that there were nine items for each of Ellis' (19b2) outlined ir­
rational beliefs. These items were then reviewed by judges familiar 
with RET, including Albert Ellis. The 99 items were then adminis­
tered to a sample of 123 ^ s, including males and females, various 
age groups, and a variety of occupations. The 60 items which had 
the highest item-total correlations were then chosen as the final 
Adult Irrational Ideas Inventory. Fox and Davies (1971) then ad­
ministered this bO item inventory to 110 university students for 
test-retest reliability data. They found a Pearson r of .77 and 
Kuder-Richardson formula 20 coefficients of .74 on the pretest and 
.78 on the retest. In addition. Fox and Davies (1971) administered 
both theirs and the Zingle (1965) II to a group of high school 
students, and the resulting correlation was .70. Finally, the 
authors sampled mental hospital patients, alcoholics, and "a socio-
economically representative sample drawn from Edmonton—a northern 
Canadian city" (p. 24), and found no significant differences on 
irrationality between mental hospital patients and alcoholics, but 
significance (p < .01) for the comparisons (Sheffe multiple com­
parison of main effects) with both mental hospital patients and 
alcoholics when each group was compared with the "representative 
sample." Fox and Davies (1971) conclude that "the data gathered 
in this study definitely provides supportive evidence that the A-I-I 
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is a valid measure of irrationality as it is generally defined in 
R-ET theory. It is also clear that these results strongly support 
the basic tenet of R-ET that irrational beliefs and ideas are linked 
with emotional disturbance" (p. 24). 
Cavior and Cone (1972) have presented a study that further 
examined the Adult Irrational Ideas Inventory (All) described 
above. They point out that although Fox and Davies (1971) conclude 
that the All shows promise of validity, they "presented no evidence 
as to the convergent or discriminant validity of their scale with 
respect to common measures of stable, personal-social characteris­
tics such as intelligence, socioeconomic status, etc. Nor were they 
mindful of Campbell's (1960) suggestion regarding the need to show 
that new scales possess some degree of discriminant validity vis-a­
vis the general social desirability (SD) factor" (Cavior & Cone, 
1972: p. 13). Cavior and Cone (1972) then present their own data 
concerning the All with respect to social desirability and the in­
ternal composition of the scale. After administering the All and 
two measures of SD to 127 introductory psychology Ss (males and 
females), Cavior and Cone found that correlations (-.48 and -.45) 
between the All and both SD scales were significant (p < .001). 
Also, an All KR of .38 was obtained, indicating "an attenuated cor­
relation of All with the SD scales and . . . that the former contains 
a fairly heterogenous item pool" (p. 14). Furthermore, "a principal 
components factor analysis . . . (with the) correlation matrix com­
prised of the 60 items of the All and the two SD scales included as 
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markers" (p. 13) adds evidence to this speculation. There were not 
eleven factors, corresponding to Ellis' (1962) eleven irrational 
ideas, but only seven. Of those seven (the first being the SD 
factor), "only five . . . appeared to correspond with any of the 
eleven major irrational beliefs of Ellis" (p. 14) and "items designed 
by Fox amd Davies to measure Ellis' eighth irrational idea were found 
to divide into two factors. Further, of the 28 items used by Fox and 
Davies to measure the four major irrational ideas tapped by this 
study, only fourteen had loadings over .40 on their respective 
factors; sixteen, if loadings of .30 are included. The average 
number of items loading factors interpretable as Ellis' irrational 
ideas was 2.8" (p. 14). Cavior emd Cone (1972) conclude that "the 
All pool is insufficient to measure each of Ellis' eleven ideas . . . 
(and that) additional items need to be constructed" (p. 14). Cer­
tainly these results make Fox and Davies (1971) claim that the All 
"is a valid measure of irrationality as it is generally defined 
in R-ET theory" (p. 24) far more questionable. 
In conjunction with a lecture series at the Institute for 
Rational Living, Gustav (1968) designed a projective technique for 
the assessment of adult personal adjustment. The test consists of 
ten "stems" used in a sentence completion format. Six of the stems 
were designed to elicit responses to Ellis' (1962) irrational ideas, 
three of the stems were expected to elicit "positive elements of 
people's adjustment" (p. 1), and one stem related to individual 
definitions of success. Gustav (1968) administered her sentence 
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completion test (SCT) to 89 people who were attending lectures 
designed to teach everyday applications of RET. Only twelve of the 
89 Ss attended eight or more of the ten lectures, and these twelve 
took the SCT at the first and tenth lectures. The other 77 Ss "at­
tended the lectures sporadically and took the test only once" (p. 
1). Each item on each of the 101 test forms was then placed on a 
separate card, and a Q-Sort (Stephenson, 1953) procedure was then 
performed by three therapists acting independently of each other. 
The therapists sorted the cards into one of five categories, making 
judgments as to the nature of adjustment that the responses seemed 
to imply. Although Gustav (1968) concludes that "the Q-Sort results 
indicate that the test can be used reliably for evaluation of per­
sonal adjustment" (p. 3), the biased nature of the sampling must 
render all conclusions based on data from the study described above 
questionable, at best. In addition, the fact that the SCT is a 
projective instrument makes its use rather difficult for large 
scale research projects. 
Another test that has been designed to assess levels of ir­
rational thinking is the Personal Beliefs Inventory (PBI). Hart-
man (1968) administered an crxgxnal pool of 133 xtems that were 
selected from an "extensive review of existing professional litera= 
ture" (p. 7) to more than 500 college students. The sixty items 
yielding the highest item-total correlations were retained, and 
constitute the present form of the PBI, Each item is an irrational 
statement that can be responded to with any of five responses. 
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including totally disagree (0 points), disagree very much, disagree 
slightly, agree slightly, agree very much, and totally agree (5 points)-. 
Two separate samples of college students (30 and 85, respectively), 
from counseling service and classroom populations were administered 
the PBI, and reliability data were calculated. Test-retest relia­
bility coefficients were .89 and .91, while split-half Spearman-
Brown reliability coefficients were .95 and .90. Hartman (1968) 
then conducted two studies to see if the PBI was sensitive to changes 
in irrational thinking. One study was with eight clients undergoing 
RET, and the other was with a psychopathology class of 23 students. 
All Ss were given the PBI before RET principles were taught (before 
therapy and the first class period, respectively) and then again 
afterwards. For the clients, the mean PBI score dropped from 236 
to 121, and for the students, the mean score dropped from 163 to 91. 
Although all of the above data are based on rather small samples, 
it does appear that the PBI has some evidence for both reliability 
and validity, and further exploration as to its usefulness definitely 
seems warranted. 
Jones (1968) has developed what is probably the most carefully 
constructed measure of irrationality. He began by carefully listing 
and explaining ten irrational beliefs from the writings of Ellis 
(1962), and then writing forty items for each belief. A five-point, 
agree-disagree, Likert-type format was used. Half of the items 
were presented as rational statements and half were presented as 
irrational statements. The "best" 200 items to represent the ten 
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scales were chosen by three judges, who rated them according to how 
well they represented Ellis' (1962) irrational beliefs. These 200 
items were then administered to 131 advanced undergraduate psychology 
students as Texas Technological College. Item scores were then 
factor analyzed, and the results enabled Jones (1968) to reduce the 
number of items per scale to thirteen (high item-total correlations 
and low item-item correlations were also used to select items). 
Another factor analysis allowed Jones (1968) to reduce the number 
of items to 100, "measuring ten irrational beliefs in separate 
scales, all of them validated against orthogonal factors" (p. 66). 
The ten scales include; demand for approval; high self-expectations; 
blame proneness; frustration reactive; emotional irresponsibility; 
anxious over-concern; problem avoidance; dependency; helplessness; 
and perfectionism. 
In order to validate further the Irrational Beliefs Test 
(IBT), Jones (1968) administered his test to an additional 427 Ss, 
consisting of 105 junior college students, 73 senior students at 
Texas Technological College, 72 patients at a mental hospital (in­
cluding alcoholics, chronic schizophrenics, 15 mixed diagnoses 
involving caronicity, said 20 mixed new admissions with acute symptom 
mology), and 177 adult volunteers from the general population. With 
the data from these Ss, Jones (1968) was able to confirm virtually 
all of the following hypotheses: 
1. "As determined by factor analysis, the irrational 
beliefs enunciated by Ellis are sufficiently distinct 
in content aind stable in structure to be measurable as 
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separate constructs defined by factors which can be 
replicated in a separate nonhomogeneous population" 
(p. 35). This hypothesis was confirmed. 
"As determined by factor loadings of scale items on 
factors defining the scales, construct validity of 
the IBT scales will exceed a minimum acceptable value of 
.40" (p. 37). This hypothesis was confirmed. 
"The IBT will have sufficient homogeneity within scales 
to provide a minimum acceptable internal consistency 
reliability of .50 in any scale and a mean reliability 
of .60 for all scales" (p. 39). This hypothesis was 
confirmed using Hoyt's method, Guilford's method, and 
test-retest procedures. 
"The reliability of measurement in the IBT and the 
stability of the domain will be sufficient to provide 
a test-retest correlation between scores over a 24 hour 
period of not less than .60 for any scale and not less 
than a mean of .75 for all scales" (p. 41). An actual 
correlation of r = .92 for the total test, and from .68 
to .87 for the individual scales were obtained. 
"There will be a significant positive functional rela­
tionship between irrational beliefs as measured by the 
IBT and the self-report of maladjustment symptoms" (p. 43) 
A multiple R of .72 was found between "symptom score" 
and the IBT. 
"There will be a significant positive functional rela­
tionship between irrational beliefs as measured by the 
IBT and scales C-, H-, L+, 0+, Q3-, Q4+, of the 16 PF" 
(p. 45). Results confirmed the hypothesis except for 
IBT scales 8 and 10, which were not related to 16PF 
clinical scales. 
"There will be no significant functional relationship 
between irrational beliefs as measured by the IBT and 
scales A, E, F, G, I, M, N, Ql, aind Q2 of the 16PF" (p. 
47). This hypothesis was not confirmed. Positive 
correlations with IBT scores were found with A- (re­
served), E+ (assertive), F- (sober), N- (artless), 
cind 02- (group dependent), while the scales of G (ex­
pedient vs. conscientious), I (tough-minded vs. tender-
minded), and M (practical vs. imaginative) tended to 
correlate positively with some IBT scales and negatively 
with others. 
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8. "There will be a significant negative functional rela­
tionship between irrational beliefs as measured by the 
IBT and intelligence as measured by scale B of the 16PF" 
(p. 51). Only scales 3 and 9 of the IBT, and the IBT 
total score, were definitely positively related (p < 
.05) to scale B of the 16PF. Intelligence as measured 
by this scale does not seem to necessitate rationality 
as conceived by Ellis (or at least as measured by the 
IBT). 
9. "The IBT will be a sufficient discriminator of mental 
disturbance that patients in a mental hospital will attain 
significantly higher scores than will subjects from a 
general adult population" (p. 53). This hypothesis was 
confirmed, except for scales 1, 4, and 8 of the IBT, 
with 4 and 8 providing virtually no difference in meain 
scores. 
10. "There will be a significant negative functional relation­
ship between irrational beliefs as measured by the IBT 
and age of the subjects" (p. 53). This hypothesis was not 
confirmed, with the exception of scale 6. 
11. "Females will score significantly higher in irrational 
beliefs as measured by the IBT than will males" (p. 53). 
This hypothesis was not confirmed, except for scales 1, 
4, and 8 of the IBT. There were significant sex differ­
ences for this sample, but the differences were scale-
specific, rather than for the test as a whole. Jones con-
concludes that "women were more inclined to perceive ap­
proval as a need, to overevaluate unpleasant events, to 
worry and be anxious, and to not be self-directing. On 
the other hand, men were more inclined to set high stan­
dards for themselves, to be blamers, to reject responsi­
bility for their emotions, and to be perfectionistic" (p. 
57). 
12. "There will be a significant negative functional relation­
ship between irrational beliefs as measured by the IBT 
and education level of the subjects" (p. 57). This hypoth­
esis was confirmed for the total IBT score, and for half 
of the scale scores, while the other half were in the pre­
dicted direction but not significant. 
Further evidence of the validity of the IBT arises out of two 
studies by Trexler and Karst (1972; 1973). In the first of these 
studies, the authors compared RET, using the IBT, with both 
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attention-placebo and no-treatment conditions, in an attempt to 
reduce public-speaking anxiety. Trexler and Karst (1972) found that 
both ainxiety and irrational beliefs (as measured by the IBT) de­
creased more significantly after RET than after either of the other 
two conditions. Furthermore, scales 1, 2, and 4 seemed to be parti­
cularly related to public-speaking anxiety. In the second of their 
studies, Trexler and Karst (1973) present additional data from their 
earlier (1972) experiment. For example, test-retest reliability of 
the IBT total scores, after a two-week delay, was ,88. and for in­
dividual scales, the range was from r = .48 to r = .95, with a mean 
of .80. All scales correlated at p < .01 with IBT total scores. 
Table 1 presents the results of IBT comparisons between speech 
anxious students before treatment with RET and the following groups: 
"normal" Temple speech students, "normal" Temple students from 
another study, Texas mental hospital patients from Jones' (1968) 
study, "normal" Texas Technological College students from Jones' 
(1968) study, and speech anxious students after treatment with RET. 
It is particularly interesting to note that after RET, the public-
speaking anxious students had lower IBT scores than either the 
Temple or Texas "normal" groups (t = 3.06, p < .05, two-tailed 
test, compared with Texas student group). One final observation 
from the Trexler and Karst (1973) studies is that the IBT correlated 
positively and significantly (p < .05) with a thirty-item "Personal 
Report of Confidence as a Speaker" measure of anxiety. 
On the basis of the Jones (1968) and Trexler and Karst (1972; 
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Table 1. Comparison of IBT scores for experimental Ss (pre-
treatment) with other Ss (Trexler & Karst, 1973, p. 
152) 
Comparison Mean S.D. t^ p 
Experimental Ss 
(pretreatment; N = 33) 299.42 29.68 
Temple speech students 
(N = 33) 285.58 27.77 1.96 .05 
Temple students in 
another study (N = 46) 284.50 37.54 1.90 .05 
Texas Mental Hospital 
patients (N = 72) 305.97 35.80 .98 .20 
Texas students 
(N = 157) 281.44 33.21 3.10 .001 
Experimental Ss 
(post-treatment; N = 33) 261.51 33.20 4.84 .001 
^One-tailed t-tests. 
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1973) studies described above, the Jones (1968) IBT appears to be 
worthy of further research in the area of irrational beliefs and 
psychopathology. 
MacDonald and Games (1972) conducted three studies to consider 
another irrationality scale. While other researchers in this area 
have based items upon the writings of Albert Ellis aund various 
other RET spokespersons, MacDonald and Games (1972) actually used 
the eleven irrational values cited by Ellis (1962) as indicative 
of irrational thinking and maladjustment. By presenting these 
eleven statements along with a nine-point rating scale, ranging 
from 1 (completely disagree) to 9 (completely agree), the authors 
sought to determine directly the utility of Ellis' eleven state­
ments. 
In the first of their three studies, MacDonald and Games (1972) 
administered their "scale" to sixty West Virginia University stu­
dents (41 males and 19 females). They found that two of the eleven 
statements were not reliably associated with total scores. These 
statements were "It is easier to avoid certain difficulties and 
self-responsibilities than to face them" and "Past experiences and 
events are the determiners of present behavior; the influence of 
the past cannot be eradicated" (p. 26). In addition, these items 
were not significantly related to the other items (p < .05). There­
fore, these two statements were removed, and all other statistics 
were reported on the basis of the resulting nine-item scale. Cor­
relations between these items and the nine-item total score ranged 
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from .42 to .74 (as opposed to -.01 and -.22 for the items that 
were eliminated). The Cronbach alpha reliability coefficient for 
the nine-item scale was .73. Based on these somewhat encouraging 
results, MacDonald and Games (1972) proceeded with their develop­
ment of a scale measuring irrationality. 
Study II, by MacDonald and Games (1972), attempted to cross-
validate their instrument. The authors administered their scale 
and the California Psychological Inventory (CPI; Gough, 1957) to 
37 graduate students at West Virginia University. With this sample, 
a Cronbach alpha of .79 was obtained, and item-total correlations 
ranged from .27 to .75. Once again, the two items omitted from the 
original eleven-statement scale yielded rather small correlations 
of .00 and .27, although it should be pointed out that one of these 
items had an item-total correlation equal to that of an item that 
remained part of the scale. Ten of the CPI subscales were negatively 
and significantly correlated (p < .05) with the irrationality scale, 
including: sociability; social presence; sense of well-being; self-
control; tolerance; achievement via conformance; achievement via 
independence; intellectual efficiency; psychological-mindedness; 
and flexibility. Dominance and self-acceptance were significantly 
correlated with irrationality at p < .10. Different subscales of 
the CPI were significantly correlated (p < .05) with irrationality 
for males than were significant for females. Social presence, sense 
of well-being, self-control, tolerance, communality, achievement 
via independence, intellectual efficiency, and psychological 
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mindedness were significant for males, while sense of well-being, 
tolerance, intellectual efficiency, psychological •"•mindedness, and 
flexibility were significant (p < .05) for females. Since each of 
these "healthy" traits were found to be negatively related to ir­
rationality, MacDonald and Games (1972) concluded that there was 
evidence for the construct validity of their instrument. Reliability 
of the scale was also supported in Study II. 
Study III of the MacDonald and Games (1972) series consisted of 
administering their irrationality scale, the Eysenck Personality 
Inventory (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1968), the Taylor Manifest Anxiety 
Scale (Taylor, 1953), the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale 
(Crowne & Marlowe, 1960), and the MacDonald-Tseng Locus of Control 
Scale (MacDonald & Tseng, 1971) to 84 xxndergraduate students at 
West Virginia University. Significant correlations (p < .01) were 
found between the measure of irrationality and the Eysenck Neiiroti-
cism Scale (r = .37), the Manifest Anxiety Scale (r = .41), and the 
Locus of Control Scale (r = .44). MacDonald and Games (1972) em­
phasize that the correlations between irrationality and the neuroti-
cism and anxiety scales are even higher for males alone (r = .55 and 
.56). No significant relationship was found between irrationality 
and social desirability (r = .11), nor was the MacDonald and Games 
(1972) irrationality scale significantly (p > =05) "related to age 
(r = -.08), Ss fathers' level of education (r = .19), academic year 
(r = .12), and Eysenck lie scale (r = .10)", the' Eysenck introversion-
extraversion scale (r s -,02), the TMAS lie scale (r = ,21), family 
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size (r = -.10), or frequency of church attendance (r = .10, high 
scores are associated with frequent attendance)" (p. 28). The 
Cronbach-alpha internal consistency reliability coefficient was 
again .79. The scale was also shown to be related to several sub-
scales of the 16PF (Cat-fell, Saunders, & Stice, 1950) after being ad­
ministered to 200 undergraduate engineering students (Games, personal 
communication, 1974). 
The studies described above by MacDonald and Games (1972) and 
Games (1974) give support for the continued use of their instrument 
for additional validation research. 
Rationale, Objectives, and Hypotheses 
Content validity is an obvious, yet difficult problem for 
virtually all personality instruments. The measurement of irra­
tional beliefs, however, is somewhat different from the measurement 
of personality traits through traditional assessment techniques, 
despite the fact that paper-and-pencil questionnaires are usually 
employed for both purposes. Unlike anxiety, for example, irrational­
ity is a relatively clearly defined and described concept, with 
almost all of the researchers in this area using the same definition 
and descriptions—namely, the eleven irrational ideas referred to 
by Albert Ellis (1962). Furthermore, irrationality measures do not 
attempt or purport to tap underlying "traits" or various aspects of 
overt behavior; their sole function is to measure the extent to which 
people believe in a specific number of ideas. Although it is possible. 
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of course, that people either do not know what they believe in, or 
that they will refuse to answer truthfully, clearcut written responses 
concerning specific cognitions still seem to be far more direct and 
potentially useful (for the purpose of theory-testing) than tradi­
tional personality instruments. 
While there is some current evidence supporting the theory be­
hind RET (e.g., Trexler, 1971), there is certainly a need for more 
validating research. For this to be accomplished, however, it must 
first be demonstrated that adequate measures of irrationality have 
been devised. Although there are, at present, several instruments 
that have shown promise for the measurement of irrational beliefs 
(e.g., Jones, 1968; Hartman, 1968; MacDonald and Games, 1972) and 
the further testing of the rational-emotive theory of maladjustment, 
these instruments have not as yet been directly compared. One pur­
pose of the present study is to compare the instruments of Jones 
(1968), Hartman (1968), and MacDonald and Games (1972), 
A new one-item self-rating of irrationality will also be in­
cluded in the comparisons. The decision to include the direct self-
rating is based upon the observation that self-reports sometimes 
"provide the best as well as the cheapest predictions. Moreover, 
these predictions hold their own against, and usually exceed, those 
generated either clinically or statistically from complex inferences 
about underlying traits and states. In general, the predictive 
efficiency of simple, straightforward self-ratings and measures of 
directly relevant past performance has not been exceeded by more 
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psychoraetrically sophisticated personality tests ..." (Mischel, 
1968, p. 145). 
In conjunction with the comparisons among irrationality instru­
ments, items from each of the irrationality measures will be factor 
analyzed. This will provide a direct test of the contention of 
Jones (1968) that items from his instrument (and by implication, 
the other two irrationality instruments) measure ten distinct fac­
tors, which correspond to ten of Ellis' (1962) irrational beliefs. 
Jones' (1968) factors of anxious overconcern and blame proneness 
appear to subsume "the idea that one should become quite upset over 
other peoples' problems and disturbances" (Ellis, 1962, p. 85), 
accounting for the discrepancy between Jones' (1968) ten factors 
and Ellis' (1962) eleven irrational beliefs. 
Additional data on the internal consistency of the tests of 
irrationality will also be presented, and a social desirability 
scale will be administered to check on possible confounding of the 
irrationality instruments with social desirability. Further tests 
of the relationship between irrational beliefs and psychopathology 
described by Albert Ellis will be explored. Specifically, these 
will include the relationships between irrationality and the follow­
ing types of maladjustment discussed in A Guide to Rational Living 
(Ellis & Harper, 1961); depression, anxiety, neuroticism, and low 
self-image. Appropriate established inventories to measure these 
dimensions will be used. The relationship between irrationality 
and such variables as sex, age, year in school, income, marital 
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status, college gradepoint average, and experiences with 
psychologists or psychiatrists will also be explored. 
The following specific hypotheses are made concerning the 
variables discussed above; 
1. Factor analyses of the irrationality instruments' items 
will yield ten factors that correspond to Ellis' irrational beliefs; 
items representing a particular irrational idea will have the highest 
loadings for that particular factor; and factor loadings for speci­
fic items on each factor will be higher for items purporting to 
measure that factor, than for items purporting to measure another 
factor. 
2. Significant (p < .01) positive correlations between the 
different measures of irrationality will be found. 
3. Significant (p < .05) correlations between each measure 
of irrationality and the measures of depression, anxiety, neuroti-
cism, and low self-image will be obtained. 
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METHOD 
Sample 
The sample consisted of 352 Iowa State University student 
volunteers from a variety of psychology classes. Males and females; 
freshmen, sophomores, juniors, seniors, and graduate students; and 
married and single students were all represented. All participants 
received extra credit from their instructors for having participated 
in the study. 
Procedure 
Each person was asked to complete a questionnaire booklet con­
taining a biographical cover sheet (see APPENDIX A), the Personal 
Beliefs Inventory (PBI) (see APPENDIX B), the Irrational Beliefs 
Test (IBT) (see APPENDIX C), the MacDonald-Games Irrational Values 
Test (IVT) (see APPENDIX D), a one-item self-rating of irrationality, 
the Marlowe-Crovme Social Desirability Scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 
1960) (see APPENDIX E), the Depression Adjectives Check List (Lubin, 
1965) (see APPENDIX F), the Fear Survey Schedule (Wolpe & Lang, 1964) 
(see APPENDIX G), the Eysenck Personality Inventory (Eysenck & 
Eysenck, 1968) (see APPENDIX H), and the Tennessee Self-Concept 
Scale (Fitts, 1965) (see APPENDIX I). The order of the questionnaires 
in the booklet was varied in a roughly counter-balanced way, so that 
three different "forms" of the booklet were administered. Total 
test-taking time ranged from one to two hours. 
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Instrumentation 
The FBI, IBT, and IVT have been discussed above in detail, in 
connection with the review of measures of irrationality. Based upon 
their preliminary reliability and validity data (e.g., Trexler & 
Karst, 1972; Hartman, 1968; MacDonald & Games, 1972), they appear to 
be the most promising instruments yet developed for the measurement 
of irrationality. The one-item self-rating of irrationality is in 
response to the statement: "In important situations, I think ir­
rationally and become anxious or depressed." This item was included 
in order to determine if one relatively direct item could measure 
irrationality as well as more psychometrically sophistocated scales 
or factors could. 
The Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale is the best known, 
most frequently used social desirability scale, and has previously 
been used as part of the validation of an irrationality instrument 
(MacDonald & Games, 1972). As outlined above, the purpose of the 
social desirability scale is to provide a check that a tendency to 
respond in a socially desirable (or undesirable) fashion is not being 
measured, rather than irrationality. 
As mentioned earlier, depression, anxiety, neuroticism, and 
low self-image were chosen for this study because Ellis (Ellis & 
Harper, 1961) specifically describes their relationship with ir­
rationality. The Eysenck Personality Inventory, the Depression Ad­
jectives Check List, and the Tennessee Self-Concept Scale were 
chosen to measure the above dimensions on the basis of reviews in 
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The Seventh Mental Measurements Yearbook (Euros, 1972). Particular 
attention was paid to reliability and validity data, and to the 
length of the instruments. Test-retest reliability has been found 
to range from .80 to .97 for the Eysenck Personality Inventory; 
split-half reliability for the Depression Adjectives Check List has 
ranged from .82 to .93 for "normals;" and test-retest reliability 
for the Tennessee Self-Concept Scale has averaged in the high .80's 
(Euros, 1972). 
The difficulties that are encountered in locating a valid paper-
and-pencil measure of anxiety are numerous, and have been discussed 
in detail elsewhere (e.g., Mischel, 1968). The Fear Survey Schedule 
is a frequently used adjunct to behavior therapy for the identifica­
tion of anxious behaviors. While some psychologists view "anxiety" 
and "anxious behaviors" as different concepts, it would be rather 
ludicrous to search for an instrument that psychologists from dif­
ferent theoretical orientations agreed measured anxiety. Since it 
did not appear possible to find such an instrument, the Fear Survey 
Schedule was chosen on the basis of its straightforwardness, its 
brevity, and its reliability. "The correlations among the six sub-
scores (animal; social or interpersonal; tissue damage, illness, 
death, or associated stimuli; noises; other classical phobias; and 
miscellaneous) . . . ranged from .31 to .76 with a median of .55. 
The magnitude of these correlations suggests that the total score 
would be relatively reliable from an internal-consistency or general-
izability point of view" (Euros, 1972, p. 81). Total scores from 
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the Fear Survey Schedule, therefore, were chosen as the measure of 
anxiety for this study. 
The questionnaire booklet consisted of 470 items. Two modifi­
cations have been made where necessary in each of these items. First, 
the item responses have been converted to a 1-99 agree-disagree, 
true-false, or relevant-irrelevant format (Wolins & Dickinson, 1973), 
making them more suitable for factor analyses, without appreciably 
changing their contents. Ninety-nine point scales result in more 
reliable factors than do the short item-response formats that have 
traditionally been used (Hendricks, 1975). Second, overt sexism 
has been eliminated from the items to insure that their originally 
intended meanings were clear. This was accomplished by substituting 
gender-free nouns, pronouns, and modifiers for masculine and feminine 
nouns, pronouns, and modifiers. 
Analysis 
After eliminating incomplete data sets from the sample, item 
responses were keypunched and reordered so that the order of the 
items for all respondents was identical. Lie scale scores from the 
Eysenck Personality Inventory and validity scale scores from the 
Tennessee Self-Concept Scale were then computed to determine if some 
individuals' responses were sufficiently incredulous to be discarded. 
This was effected by employing frequency distributions of scores on 
the lie and validity scales, and checking for bimodal distributions 
(i.e., "nonliars" and "liars"). This procedure has often been used 
35 
in conjunction with the lie scale of the MMPI (Hathaway & McKinley, 
1967). 
A principal components factor analysis (Hotelling, 1933), 
using the largest item inter-correlations, rather than unities, 
in the diagonal, was then carried out for all of the irrationality 
items. Different numbers of factors were rotated using varimax 
rotation (Kaiser, 1958), where the various numbers of factors were 
chosen on the basis of changes in eigenvalues. The group of factors 
that was most meaningful (e.g,; appeared not to be based upon artifacts, 
such as response sets) was then selected, using items with high factor 
loadings (> .40) and by considering the consistency of their content. 
After the factors were chosen, items were selected to represent 
these factors by reviewing their factor loadings and their consisten­
cy of content, and by seeking to maximize the variance accounted for. 
Scores on scales representing the factors were calculated from the 
items loading highly (> .40), using positive and negative unit-
weights. These scales were then correlated with social desirability, 
depression, anxiety, neuroticism, self-concept, sex, age, year in 
school, family income, marital status, college gradepoint average, 
and experiences with psychologists and psychiatrists. All of the 
correlations between factors and the variables listed above were 
calculated with males and females combined, and then again, with 
males and females separated. Freshmen were not included with the 
remainder of the sample when correlations with college gradepoint 
were computed because of their lack of college grades. Correlations 
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with income were calculated with log income, rather than income, 
in order to reduce the skewness of the distribution with respect 
to this variable. 
A measure of the internal consistency of each of the irrational­
ity factors was computed. This was accomplished by calculating dis­
criminant reliabilities, using the following formula: 
" 0 =  2  
1 + (n-1) 
n 
In this equation, r^ refers to discriminant reliability, n refers 
to the number of items being used to represent a particular factor, 
and Za refers to the sum of the absolute values of the factor load­
ings of the items being used to represent a particular factor. This 
formula for discriminant reliability is related to the Spearman-
Brown prophecy formula, which has been widely used in assessing the 
reliability of tests (Cranny, 19b7). 
Irrationality scores were then calculated for the original ir­
rationality instruments. Inter-correlations were computed for total 
scores on the IBT, PBI, and IVT, along with social desirability, 
depression, anxiety, neuroticism, self-concept, sex, age, year in 
school, marital status, and experiences with psychologists and 
psychiatrists. 
The final stage of the analysis consisted of comparing the 
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three forms of the questionnaire booklet to search for an order 
effect. This was necessary because of the length of the test battery, 
and was accomplished by computing inter-item correlations separately 
for each form, for all irrationality items. Within-factor, within-
scale, within-form inter-item correlations were employed to determine 
if order effects were present. Item means were also compared be­
tween forms for the same purpose. 
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RESULTS 
Exclusion of Data 
Careful examination of the 352 questionnaire booklets revealed 
that four individuals had left substantial numbers of questions blank; 
their questionnaires were eliminated from the sample, leaving a total 
of 348. 
Individual scores from the lie scale of the Eysenck Personality 
Inventory and the validity scale of the Tennessee Self-Concept Scale 
were then ranked in order to determine if their distributions were 
bimodal (i.e., "liars" emd "nonliars"). This was not found to be 
the case, and thus no persons were excluded on these grounds. 
Detailed Sample Description 
The sample of 348 Iowa State University students consisted of 
120 males and 22S females, averaging 15.1 years of age and 0.S3 
years of college. An overwhelming majority of these students were 
single5 with only 22 individuals reporting being married or separated 
from their spouses. The mean family income was approximately $19,000 
per year, with most families being in the $10,000 to $15,000 range. 
The mean gradepoint average (excluding freshmen) was 2.85, 2.76 for 
males and 2.91 for females. 
Only 21 persons reported having seen a psychologist or psychia­
trist professionally, and only 17 persons anticipated seeing a psy­
chologist or psychiatrist in the near future. 
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Factor Analysis 
The principal components factor analysis provided eigenvalues 
for 172 factors, 172 irrationality items having been included in the 
analysis. The number of factors to be rotated was chosen on the 
basis of changes in these eigenvalues. Table 2 includes eigenvalues 
and percentages of variance accounted for by the first twenty factors. 
Rotations were carried out for seven, eleven, fourteen, fifteen, and 
sixteen factors. 
As reported earlier, items with factor loadings greater than 
or equal to .40 were used to decide which grouping of factors was 
most meaningful. These same items were employed to name the seven 
factors that were selected according to the aforementioned procedure. 
The items, along with their means, standard deviations, and factor 
loadings are presented in Tables 3-9. The seven factors apcount 
for approximately 30.3% of the total variance of the 172 irrational­
ity items. 
Factor 1 (see Table 3), titled Evaluating, accounts for approxi­
mately 7.0% of the total variance of irrationality items, and 23.1% 
of the total variance in the seven factors. This factor contains 
many "should" items, i.e., statements with assumptions that definite, 
clearcut, and morally correct behaviors exist. There are also con­
siderable suggestions in these items that people are "supposed to" 
evaluate, judge, and blame themselves when they do not behave in 
the "right" or "correct" mamner. Evaluating and blaming are somehow 
supposed to make things better. Examples includes "A person should 
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Table 2. Eigenvalues and percentages of variance of irrationality 
items for the first twenty factors 
Factor Eigenvalues Percent variance Cumulative percent 
1 16.93 9.84 9.84 
2 8.85 5.15 14.99 
3 7.35 4.27 19.26 
4 5.12 2.98 22.24 
5 4.78 2.78 25.02 
6 4.64 2.69 27.71 
7 4.39 2.55 30.26 
8 4.10 2.38 32.65 
9 3.90 2.26 34.91 
10 3.76 2.18 37.10 
11 3.64 2.11 39.21 
12 3.52 2.04 41.26 
13 3.47 2.02 43.28 
14 3.42 1.99 45.26 
15 3.30 1.92 47.18 
16 3.21 1.86 49.04 
17 3.10 1.80 50.85 
18 3.07 1.79 52.63 
19 3.03 1.76 54.50 
20 3.01 1.75 56.15 
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Table 3. Factor 1; Evaluating 
Iteia^ Mean S.D. Loading 
109. A person should blame others 
for their mistakes or bad 
behavior. -141.86 93.00 .69 
107. One should blame others 
severely for all mistakes 
and wrongdoings. -119.19 103.61 .68 
108. Punishing oneself for all 
errors will help prevent 
future mistakes. -116,86 105,09 .68 
116. If things are not the way 
one would like them to be, 
it is a catastrophe. -140.99 92.89 .67 
115. Because parents or society 
taught acceptance of certain 
traditions, one must go on i 
accepting these traditions. -141,49 ' 88,96 ,66 
106, Incompetence in anything 
whatsoever is an indication 
that a person is inadequate 
or valueless. -138,25 98,30 ,60 
110, One should spend consider­
able time and energy trying 
to reform others, =78,39 98,21 ,58 
114, Because a person was once 
weak and helpless, one must 
always remain so, -169,23 79,58 ,57 
^Items 1-100 are from the IBT, 101=160 from the PBI, and 
162-172 from the IVT. 
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Table 3. (continued) 
Item Mean S.D. Loading 
111. One can best help others by 
criticizing them and sharply 
pointing out the errors of 
their ways. -121.49 101.12 .56 
117. Other people should make things 
easier for us, and help with 
life's difficulties. -12.90 101.64 .56 
122. Unhappiness is externally 
caused or created by outside 
persons and events. -34.24 88.58 .52 
166. Unhappiness is caused by out­
side circumstances, and the 
individual has no control over 
it. -97.30 93.14 .51 
164. Some people are bad, villain­
ous , or vjicksd and therefore 
should be blamed or punished. -49.16 96.60 .50 
105. The main goal and purpose of 
life is achievement and success. -27.33 115.38 .48 
158. You owe obedience to your 
parents just because they are 
your parents. -17.62 114.01 .48 
127. Maximum human happiness Ccin 
be achieved by passively and 
uncommittedly "enjoying 
oneself." -41.59 112.96 .47 
102. What others think of you is 
most important. -45.11 116.02 .46 
112. It is natural to get upset by 
the errors and stupidities of 
others. -2.27 97,20 .46 
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Table 3. (continued) 
Item Mean S.D. Loading 
126. Certain people are bad, wicked 
or villainous and should be 
blamed and punished for their 
sins. -55.74 100.66 .46 
163. One must be perfectly compe­
tent, adequate, and achieving 
to consider oneself worthwhile. -76.32 106.58 .46 
165. It is a terrible catastrophe 
when things are not as one 
wants them to be. -95.07 89.68 .44 
103. Depending on others is better 
than depending on oneself. -124.58 84.35 .43 
104. A person should be thoroughly 
adequate J talented. 
and intelligent in all possible 
respects. -18.85 115.72 .43 
168. It is easier to avoid certain 
difficulties and self-
responsibilities than to face 
them -12.43 119.42 .43 
167. Dangerous or fearsome things 
are causes for great concern, 
and their possibility iiiiist be 
continually dwelt upon. -75.89 101.43 .42 
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blame others for their mistaken or bad behavior;" "Punishing 
oneself for all errors will help prevent future mistakes;" "One 
should spend considerable time and energy trying to reform others;" 
and "The main goal and purpose of life is achievement and success." 
There is also a component of dependency and helplessness in this 
factor, particularly apparent in the following items: "Because 
parents or society taught acceptance of certain traditions, one must 
go on accepting these traditions;" "Because a person was once weak 
and helpless, one must always remain so;" and "Unhappiness is ex­
ternally caused or created by outside persons and events." Factor 
1, then, encompasses blaming, judging, and/or evaluating people and 
their behavior, in a context of dependency and helplessness. 
Evaluating has a discriminant reliability of .87. 
Factor 2, presented in Table 4, is titled Neuroticism. It 
accounts for 6.7% of the total variance, and 22.0% of the common 
variance. The items reflect the rather "typical neurotic" symptoms 
of anxiety and insecurity. The items loading highest on this fac­
tor, with factor loadings of .7(3 and .74, respectively, are "I 
shrink from facing a crisis or difficulty" and "I worry over pos­
sible misfortune." Worrying, in fact, is included with respect to 
past behavior (e.g., "I feel guilty because of the sins I have com­
mitted"), present traits (e.g., "My feelings are easily hurt"), and 
futurjepossibilities (e.g., "I worry over possible misfortune"). 
Annoyance and envy regarding a variety of people and situations is 
also part of this factor. Examples include: "I become annoyed over 
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Table 4. Factor 2; Neuroticism 
Item^ Mean S.D. Loading 
151. I shrink from facing a crisis 
or difficulty. -47.48 93.14 .76 
148. I worry over possible mis­
fortune. -15.89 106.86 .74 
147. I feel self-conscious and un­
comfortable when in the presence 
of those whom I consider to be 
my superiors. 22.11 104.20 .71 
149. At times I think I am no good 
at all. -7.33 127.57 .71 
150. I get excited or upset when 
things go wrong. 21.15 94.30 .70 
155. I feel guilty because of the 
sins I have committed. -40.09 118.19 .68 
157. There is invariably a right, 
precise, and perfect solution 
to human problems, and it is 
a catastrophe when this per­
fect solution isn't found. -110.30 98.10 .64 
132. When I'm in a group, I'm al­
ways afraid I may say or do 
something foolish. -11^72 102 = 65 =62-
82. I become annoyed over little 
things. -6.82 96.23 .61 
146. My feelings are easily hurt. 20.03 104.93 .59 
^Iterns 1-100 are from the IBT, 101-160 from the FBI, and 
162-172 from the IVT. 
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Table 4. (continued) 
Item Mean S.D. Loading 
134. I tend to do or say things I 
later hate myself for, -14.45 110.10 .57 
133. If you once start doing favors 
for people, they may just walk 
all over you. -24.42 102.80 .53 
135. When things go badly, I tend 
to blame myself. 33.38 85.24 .50 
162. It is essential that one be 
loved or approved by virtually 
everyone in his or her com­
munity. -79.42 117.84 .49 
156. I tend to become upset and 
miserable when things-axeTiot 
- The way I would like them to be. 0.56 88.29 .48 
152. I have reason for feeling jealous 
of one or more members of my 
fajnily. -113.04 112.44 .47 
81. I have concern with what people 
are feeling about me. 69.89 82.12 .44 
154. I become depressed because of 
ray own deficiencies or short­
comings. 12,47 98.58 ,42 
153. It makes me angry or upset when 
other people interfere with my 
daily activity. -50.61 89.14 .41 
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little things" and "I have reason for feeling jealous of one or 
more members of my family." Neuroticism, as Factor 2, specifically 
refers to anxiety, insecurity, and resentment. The discriminant 
reliability of Neuroticism is .91. 
Factor 3, titled Rationality-I, is presented in Table 5. This 
factor accounts for 3.5% of the total variance of irrationality items, 
and 11.7% of the variance in the seven factors. Items loading high 
on this factor are consistent in their descriptions of a lack of 
anxiety and acceptance of events philosophically (i.e,, reasonably 
rather than in a judgmental fashion). Examples include: "I feel 
no anxiety over unexpected dangers or future events;" "If I can't 
keep something from happening, then I don't worry about it;" and 
"I accept what happens philosophically." These items clearly 
reflect one aspect of the well-adjusted, adaptive, or, to use RET 
terminology, rational point of view. Factor 6, described below, 
also reflects rational RET principles. Rationality-I has a dis­
criminant reliability of .56. This is the lowest reliability of 
any of the seven factors. 
Factor 4, titled Avoidance, is presented in Table 6. It ac­
counts for 3.2% of the total variance, and 10,4% of the common 
variance. The items reflect a strong lack of confidence. The 
items loading highest (.66) on this factor include: "I put off 
important decisions" and "I avoid facing my problems." Other ex­
amples include: "People need a source of strength outside them­
selves" and "Everyone needs someone he or she can depend on for help 
48 
Table 5. Factor 3: Rationality-I 
Item^ Mean S.D. Loading 
16. I feel no anxiety over un­
expected dangers or future 
events. -24.06 111.33 .48 
36. If I can't keep something 
from happening, then I don't 
worry about it. 1.34 94.74 .47 
31. I like myself even when many 
others don't. 56.78 95.82 .45 
15. People are disturbed not by 
situations, but by the view 
they take of them. 62.04 92,96 .44 
4. I accept what happens 
philosophically. 20.33 74.68 .42 
^Items 1-100 are from the IBT, 101-160 from the PBI, and 
162-172 from the IVT. 
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Table 6. Factor 4; Avoidance 
Item^ Mean S.D. Loading 
7. I put off important decisions. =12.50 104.04 .66 
27. I avoid facing my problems. -46.72 98.58 .66 
28. People need a source of 
strength outside themselves. 89.57 104.30 .57 
17. I try to go ahead and get 
irksome tasks behind me when 
they come up. 51.55 79.55 -.56 
37. I make decisions as promptly 
as I can. 24.89 86.26 -.51 
6. I have a fear of some things 
that bother me. 28.30 109.98 .47 
8. Everyone needs someone he or 
she can depend upon for help 
and advice. 126.32 98.98 .43 
^Items 1-100 are from the IBT, 101-160 from the FBI, and 
162-172 from the IVT. 
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and advice." Avoidance, therefore, is comprised of avoiding dif­
ficult situations and avoiding personal responsibility for one's 
own behavior. The discriminant reliability of this factor is .75. 
Factor 5 (see Table 7) is titled Perfectionism, and accounts 
for 3.1% of the total variance of irrationality items, and 10.3% 
of the variance in the seven factors. Evaluating and judging are 
once again important to this factor, with both moral issues and 
other kinds of problems approached with the view that there is a 
perfect way of relating to the world. Examples of items loading 
highly on this factor include: "People today have forgotten how 
to feel properly ashamed of themselves;" "I set a high standard 
for myself and expect others to do the same ;" "Every problem has 
a correct solution;" and "People should obey moral laws more strictly 
than they do." Perfectionism does not appear to have the qualities 
more associated with self-righteousness than with insecurity. Per­
fectionism has a discriminant reliability of .65. 
Factor 6 is titled Rationality-II, and is presented in Table 8. 
This factor accounts for 3.1% of the total variance, and 10.3% of 
the common variance. Importsmt elements of Rationality-II include 
nonjudging and responsibility for an individual's own behavior, 
but not for ethers' behavior. Examples of items with high factor 
loadings include; "No one is evil even though his or her deeds may 
be;" "I do not become upset over the mistakes of others;" and "People 
make their own hell within themselves." As with Rationality-I, this 
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Table 7. Factor 5; Perfectionism 
Item^ Mean S.D. Loading 
139. People today have forgotten 
how to feel properly ashamed of 
themselves. -45.63 97.87 .60 
140. I set a high standard for my­
self and feel others should do 
the same. 19.81 96.98 .53 
138. For most questions there is one 
right sinswer, once a person has 
the facts. -39.50 108.24 .52 
50. Every problem has a correct 
solution. -41.05 117.04 .46 
129. People should observe moral laws 
more strictly than they do. 17.42 105.70 .41 
145. Some of my family and/or friends 
have habits that bother and 
smnoy me. 49.75 94.01 .41 
^Items 1-100 are from the IBT, 101-160 from the PBI, and 
162-172 from the IVT. 
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Table 8. Factor 6: Rationality-II 
Item^ Mean S.D. Loading 
93» No one is evil even though his 
or her deeds may be. -1.34 102.22 .57 
94. I do not become upset over the 
mistakes of others. -0.11 83.23 .52 
44. I accept things the way they 
are, even if I don't like them. -14.37 85.90 .49 
43. I never blame people for their 
wrongdoings. -36.82 84.18 .46 
95. People make their own hell 
within themselves= 50=67 87=04 ,45 
78. I find it easy to seek advice, 26.31 99.85 .41 
^Iteiiis 1=100 are from the IBT^ 101-160 from the PBI, and 
162-172 from the IVT. 
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factor is very consistent with RET principles regarding descrip­
tions of good adjustment and healthy self-talk. The discriminant 
reliability of Rationality-II is .65. 
Factor 7 (see Table 9) is entitled Fear of failure. It ac­
counts for 3.7% of the total irrationality item variance, and 12.2% 
of the variance in the seven factors. This factor is somewhat 
more passive than Avoidance, to which it appears somewhat similar. 
Both factors are related to insecurity and to various fears. Where­
as Avoidance is primarily concerned with a relatively active avoid­
ance of difficult situations and responsibility, this factor is 
composed of items which describe a more general and passive self-
critical attitude and lack of confidence. Examples of such items 
include; "It upsets me to make mistakes;" "I hate to fail at eoiy-
thing;" and "I worry about how much people approve of and accept 
me." Fear of failure has a discriminant reliability of .74. 
The seven factors described above had between twenty-five 
(Evaluating) and five (Rationality-I) items with factor loadings 
greater than or equal to .40. Although Fear of failure had the 
single highest loading (.77) Neuroticism had five items with 
loadings greater than or equal to .70. RationalitV"I had the 
lowest series of factor loadings, with the five highest loadings 
on this factor ranging from .48 to .42. Consequently, Neuroticism 
had the highest discriminant reliability (.91), and Rationality-I had 
the lowest (.56). The mean discriminant reliability for the seven 
factors was .73, and the median was .74. Table 10 contains a listing 
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Table 9. Factor 7; Fear of failure 
Item^ Mean S.D. Loading 
72. It upsets me to make mistakes. 51.33 85.71 .77 
73. Its unfair that "the rain falls 
on both the just and the un­
just." -39.49 105.61 .59 
2. I hate to fail at anything. 96.99 84.73 .54 
71. I worry about how much people 
approve of aoid accept me. 27.39 97.18 .52 
1. It is important to me that 
others approve of me. 73.58 91.12 .49 
26. I can't get my mind off some 
concerns. 61.60 106.45 .41 
97. If something is necessary, I do 
it even if it is unpleasant. 90.88 71.49 .41 
^Iterns 1-100 are from the IBT, 101-160 from the FBI, and 
162-172 from the IVT. 
Table 10, Content, means, standard deviations, and discriminant reliabilities of the factors 
Factor Content Mean 
Standard Discriminant 
deviation reliability 
1. Evaluating 
2„ Neuroticism 
3„ Rationality-I 
4„ Avoidance 
5o Perfectionism 
6„ Rationality-II 
7„ Fear of failure 
Blaming, judging, and evaluating 
people and their behavior; de­
pendency and helplessness 
Anxiety, insecurity, and resent­
ment 
Lack of anxiety and acceptance 
of events philosophically 
Avoiding difficult situations and 
avoiding personal responsibility 
for behavior; lack of confidence 
Perfectionism, self-righteousness 
Responsibility for one's own be­
havior, but not for others'; lack 
of Judging 
Various fears and insecurities; 
passivity; self-criticism 
-1406.30 792.53 
-341.98 1137.31 
116.43 273.73 
261.40 290.72 
-39.20 356.45 
24.34 290.58 
362.28. 412.34 
.87 
.91 
.56 
.75 
,65 
,65 
.74 
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of the seven factors, summaries of their content, factor means and 
standard deviations, and discriminant reliabilities. 
Correlations among Factors 
In determining which items should be retained to represent the 
seven factors described above, all items with loadings greater than 
or equal to .40 were carefully examined for each factor, to insure 
consistent meanings and to maximize the variance accounted for. The 
item; "Maximum human happiness can be achieved by passively and 
uncommittedly 'enjoying oneself" (see Table 3) was interpreted as 
being relatively inconsistent with the other items of Evaluating. 
Therefore, this item, and all other items with lower factor loadings 
(less than .47), were not retained for this factor. For all of the 
other factors, all items with loadings greater than or equal to .40 
were employed in computing the correlations described below. 
The correlations between each of the seven factors, social 
desirability5 depression, anxiety, neuroticism, self-concept, sex, 
age, year in school, marital status, and experiences with psycholo­
gists and psychiatrists are reported in Table 11. These correlations 
were calculated with males and females combined (N = 348). Table 
12 lists the same correlations for males only (N = 120), and Table 
13 lists these correlations for females only (N = 228). Table 14 
lists correlations between all of the variables listed above and 
college gradepoint average, with freshmen not included, for males 
and females combined (N = 166), males only (N = 68), and females 
Table 11. Correlations^ among factors and the other variables 
(males and females combined) 
Age 
Sex 
Class 
Marital status 
Past exp'nce w/psych. 
Expected exp'nce w/psych. 
Evaluating 
Neuroticism 
Rationality-I 
Avoidance 
Perfectionism 
Rationality-II 
Fear of failure 
Social desirability 
Depression 
Neuroticism 
Anxiety 
Self-image 
Age S^ C MS PPE EPE E N 
15* 67* 35* -27* -02 -10 -12 
-15* -04 -03 -02 -17* 03 
31* -12 00 -03 -09 
-03 06 -13 -09 
05 -02 00 
-08 -14* 
43* 
^ecimals omitted; N - 348. 
Heading abbreviations: S=Sex; C=Class; MS=Marital status; 
PPE=Past experience with psych.; EPE=Expected experience with 
psych; E=Evaluating; N=Neuroticism; R-I=Rationality-I; AV=Avoidance; 
P=Perfectionism; R-II=Rationality-II; FF=Fear of failure; SD= 
Social desirability; D=Depression; NT=Neuroticism; ANX=Anxiety; 
SI=Self-image. 
^Significant, p < .01. 
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R-I AV P R-II FF SD D NT ANX SI 
05 -06 -08 04 -20* -01 01 -13 -08 04 
-Ob 09 -05 07 05 16* -14* 05 31* 18* 
02 -11 -10 -05 -16* 04 03 -14* -06 04 
02 
o
 1 -07 -04 -12 02 -05 -10 -02 05 
-03 -04 -04 -11 04 -01 00 -04 04 03 
-01 -13 -02 -04 -01 02 -15* -17* -21* 17* 
-m 09 _^* 04 20* -04 32* 17* 25* -32* 
-35* -W -43* 57* 72* 55* -54* 
-30* -M* 28* -^ * 26* -31* -33* -32* 23* 
i2 -^6 29* -40* 37* 50* 41* -46* 
-10 _21* 00 11 12 12 -05 
-12* 36* -18* -15* -06 19* 
-27* 31* 57* 31* -24* 
-43* =45* =22* 55* 
51* 40* -62* 
49* -54* 
-35* 
Table 12. Correlations^ among factors and the other variables 
(males only) 
Age MS PPE EPE E N 
Age 68* 40* -24* -10 -06 -07 
Class 33* -02 -03 -13 -08 
Marital status 07 06 -16 -01 
Past experiences with psych. 14 -17 -14 
Expected experiences with psych. 03 01 
Evaluating 42* 
Neuroticism 
Rationality-I 
Avoidance 
Perfectionism 
Rationalitv-II 
Fear of failure 
Social desirability 
Depression 
Neuroticism 
Anxiety 
Self-image 
^ecimals omitted; N = 120. 
Heading abbreviations: C=Class; MS=Marital status; PPE=Past 
experiences with psych.; EPE=Expected experiences with psych.; E= 
Evaluating; N=Neuroticism; R-I=Rationality-I; AV=Avoidance ; P= 
Perfectionism; R-II=Rationality-II; FF=Fear of failure; SD=Social 
desirability; D=Depression; NT=Neuroticism; ANX=Anxiety; SI=Self-
image. 
^Significant, p < .01. 
bO 
R-I AV P R-II FF SD D NT ANX SI 
04 02 -21 01 -11 -01 02 -24* -08 05 
05 -13 -24* -02 -02 12 02 -25* -08 13 
-04 -01 -23* -07 02 -07 01 -09 03 07 
10 -16 -14 -12 03 04 -15 -08 -05 19 
-13 -12 04 -23* 06 -11 08 -10 -11 02 
-11 14 33* 07 04 34* 24* 29* -36* 
-12.* âà* 30* -08 -39* 58* 75* 56* -55* 
-30* -^* 04 -22 11 -31* -29* -37* 22 
14 05 23* -34* 36* 53* 42* -40* 
02 21 18 05 17 15 04 
-20 34* -17 -13 -04 10 
-17 21 45* 30* -14 
-38* -42* -25* 47* 
49* 45* -66* 
55* -55* 
=46* 
Table 13. Correlations^ among factors and the other variables 
(females only) 
Age 
Class 
Marital status 
Past experiences with psych. 
Expected experiences with psych. 
Evaluating 
Neuroticism 
Rationalitv-I 
Avoidance 
Perfectionism 
Rationality-II 
Fear of failure . 
Social desirability 
Depression 
Neuroticism 
Anxiety 
Self-image 
Age C^ MS PPE EPE E N 
32* -30* 01 -17* -14 
29* -18* 01 -02 -09 
0
 1 06 -13 -14 
02 04 
-15 
06 
-20* 
46* 
^Decimals omitted; N = 228. 
Heading abbreviations; C=Class; MS=Marital status; PPE=Past 
experiences with psych.; EPE=Expected experiences with psych.; E= 
Evaluating; N=Neuroticism; R-I=Rationality-I; AV=Avoidance; P= 
Perfectionism; R-II=Rationality-II; FF=Fear of failure; SD=Social 
desirability; D=Depression; NT=Neuroticism; ANX=Anxiety; SI=Self-
image. 
^Significant, p < .01, 
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R-I AV P R-II FF SD D NT ANX SI 
04 -09 -02 07 -23* 03 —02 -07 -02 08 
-01 -07 -03 -05 -24* 03 01 -08 03 02 
04 -10 03 -03 -20* 08 -09 -11 -04 04 
-10 02 01 -10 04 -03 06 —02 10 -04 
05 -14 02 04 -05 09 -26* -20* -26* 25* 
-11 08 05 22^* -05 29* 15 36* -25* 
-38* 48* -11 *^ -47* 59* 71* 57* -56* 
-29* -10 39* 36* -34* -35* -29* 26* 
08 -12 33* -46* 41* 49* 39* -53* 
-15 -09 13 10 14 -10 
-16 37* -18* -16 -11 22* 
-34* 39* 63* 32* -32* 
-44* -49* -31* 58* 
54* 48* -59* 
48* -56* 
-43* 
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Table 14. Correlations between college gradepoint average and all 
other variables^ 
Variable 
Males and 
females 
combined 
Males 
only 
Females 
only 
N = 166 N = 68 N = 98 
Age -11 -15 -06 
Sex 13 
-
-
Class 02 19 -08 
Marital status -02 -01 -03 
Past experiences with psych. -05 -08 -02 
Expected experiences with psych. 11 13 11 
Evaluating -M -11 
Neuroticism -07 -10 -05 
Rationality-I 00 -12 
Avoidance -03 04 
Perfectionism -08 -06 -10 
Rationalitv-II -03 -04 -04 
Fear of failure 06 -05 16 
Social desirability 00 -04 01 
Depression 08 09 11 
Neuroticism 02 01 00 
Anxiety 08 02 04 
Self-image 11 05 13 
^Decimals omitted. 
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only (N = 98). Table 15 lists correlations between log salary and 
all of the variables listed above with males and females combined 
(N = 315), males alone (N = 112), and females alone (N = 203). 
Examination of Table 11 reveals a number of significant (p < 
.01) correlations between factors that their descriptions would lead 
one to expect. Although the derived factor solution produced an 
orthogonal, uncorrelated, factor structure, the use of unit-weight-
ing for calculating scores on scales representing the factors per­
mits nonzero correlations among the factors. For example. Rationalitv-
_! and Rationality-II have a correlation of .28, not an astronomical 
figure, but higher than any of the correlations between Rationality-
II and any of the other factors. Avoidance and Fear of failure have 
a correlation of .29; and Evaluating and Perfectionism have a cor­
relation of .37. A pcirticular noteworthy relationship, in view of 
RET, is that Evaluating and Neuroticism have a correlation of .43. 
The correlations between Evaluating and Perfectionism (r = .37), 
and between Evaluating and Fear of failure (r = .20) also are con­
sistent with RET. Similarly, Neuroticism is significantly (p < .01) 
correlated with Rationality-I (r = -.35), with Avoidance (r = .52), 
with Permetiqnism (r = .33), and with Fear of failure (r = .63). 
Avoidance, -.14 with Perfectionism, and -.26 with Fear of failure 
(all significant, p < .01). Finally, Perfectionism and Fear of 
failure are significamtly (p < .01) related (r = .21), as are Fear 
of failure and Rationality-II (r = -.17). 
on the other hand, has correlations of -.30 with 
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Table 15. Correlations between log salary and all other variables 
Variable 
Males and 
females 
combined 
Males 
only 
Females 
only 
N = 315 N = 112 N = 203 
Age 
-24* -27* -19* 
Sex 15* - -
Class -14 -20 -07 
Marital status -18* -15 -19* 
Past experiences with psych. 08 02 12 
Expected experiences with psych. 04 13 00 
Evaluating 92 10 13 
Neuroticism 05 03 04 
Rationalitv-I 91 29 -08 
Avoidance 02 05 -03 
Perfectionism -02 =06 00 
Rationalitv-II -13 00 -21* 
Fear of failure 06 06 04 
Social desirability -12 -12 -17 
Depression 09 14 09 
Neuroticism 01 02 -01 
Anxiety 07 03 02 
Self-image -06 -06 -11 
^Decimals omitted. 
^Significant, p < .01. 
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To summarize the inter-factor correlations, Evaluating is 
significantly (p < .01) related to three of the other factors. 
Neuroticism to five of the other factors, Rationality-I to five of 
the other factors, Avoidance to three of the other factors. Per­
fectionism to four of the other factors, Rationality-II to two of 
the other factors, and Fear of failure to all six of the other 
factors. When factors are correlated separately for males and fe­
males (see Tables 12 and 13), the only factor which appears to be 
affected is Rationality-II, with fairly substantial differences in 
correlations appearing for this factor and its relationships to 
Rationality-I (r = =04 for males, r = .39 for females), Avoidance 
(r = .05 for males, r =-.12 for females), and Perfectionism (r = 
.02 for males, r = -.15 for females. 
Correlations among Factors and other Variables 
In this section, the significant (p < .01) relationships be­
tween the seven factors and age, sex, year in school (or class), 
marital status, past experiences with psychologists and psychiatrists, 
expected experiences with psychologists and psychiatrists, college 
gradepoint average, log family income ; social desirability, depres­
sion, neuroticism, anxiety, and self-image will be presented (see 
Tables 11-15) . Correlations will be reported for combined male and fe­
male samples, and also for males and females separately. Since the grade= 
point (freshmen eliminated from sample, N = 166 for males and females 
combined) and family income (missing data, N = 315 for males and 
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females combined) correlations are based upon somewhat different 
samples than the other correlations, they will be reported separate­
ly. Also, there were very few persons who reported not being single 
(N = 22), and even fewer who reported having seen psychologists or 
psychiatrists (N = 21), or who anticipated seeing psychologists or 
psychiatrists in the near future (N = 17). These deficiencies in 
the sample must be taken into account in interpreting correlations 
concerning marital status and concerning experiences with psycholo­
gists and psychiatrists. 
Evaluating was significantly (p < .01) related to sex (r = -.17, 
females reported evaluating less than males), depression (r = .32), 
neuroticism (r = .17), anxiety (r = .25), and self-image (r = -.32, 
evaluating being associated with a low self-image), with male and 
female data combined. Specifically, females (mean = -919.02 and 
s.di = 445=54; for items loading > .47 on Evaluating) tended to report 
themselves as evaluating, blaming, and judging less often than did 
males (mean = 0747.75 and s.d. = 497.93, for items loading > .47 on 
Evaluating). Examinations of Tables 12 ajid 13, however, reveal no 
large differences between males and females with respect to cor­
relations between Evaluating and depression, neuroticism, anxiety, 
and self-image. For both sexes, then, evaluating, blaming, and 
judging are associated with depression, neuroticism, anxiety, and 
a low self-concept. The only relatively minor exception is that 
for females, the correlation between Evaluating and neuroticism 
is only ,15 (significant, p< .05), whereas for males this 
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correlation is .24 (significant, p< .01). 
The Neuroticism factor was found to be significantly (p < .01) 
related to anticipated experiences with psychologists or psychia­
trists in the near future (r = -.14, neurotic responses associated 
with anticipating seeing a psychologist or psychiatrist), social 
desirability (r = -.43, neurotic responses associated with choosing 
socially undesirable responses), depression (r = .57), neuroticism 
(r = .72), anxiety (r = .55), and self-image (r = -.54, neurotic 
responses being associated with a poor self-concept), when male sjid 
female samples were combined. When the correlations were computed 
sepairately for males and females, the only large differences oc­
curred in the comparisons between Neuroticism atnd past experiences 
with psychologists or psychiatrists (r = -.14 for males, r = .06 for 
females), amd Neuroticism and anticipated experiences with psycholo­
gists or psychiatrists (r = .01 for males, r = -.20 for females). 
Since a negative correlation between Neuroticism and the experiences 
with psychologists or psychiatrists items indicates that Neuroticism 
is associated with having seen, and anticipating seeing, psycholo­
gists or psychiatrists, these results are not surprising. A very 
small number of both males and females, however, responded affirma­
tively to the questions asking about their experiences with psy­
chologists cind psychiatrists. Therefore, caution is advised with 
respect to considering these findings too seriously. In summary, 
the Neuroticism factor is significantly (p < .01) related to de­
pression, neuroticism, anxiety, and poor self-concept, but it is 
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somewhat confounded with social desirability. 
With males and females considered together, Rationality-I, 
(e.g., lack of anxiety and acceptance of events philosophically) 
was found to be significantly (p < .01) correlated with social de­
sirability (r = .26, rational responses tending to be socially 
desirable), depression (r = -.31), neuroticism (r = -.33), anxiety 
(r = -.32), and self-image (r = .23, rational responses being as­
sociated with a good self-image). No appreciable differences were 
found when male and female data were analyzed separately, except 
for some varying of nonsignificant (p > .01) correlations between 
Rationality-1 and past aind anticipated experiences with psycholo­
gists or psychiatrists. Although depression, neuroticism, anxiety, 
and low self-concept are all significantly (p < .01) related to 
Rationalitv-I, this factor, too, is partially confounded with 
social desirability. In considering the magnitude of these 
correlations, it should be remembered that the discriminant relia­
bility of Rationality-I is only ,56. 
Avoidance was found to be significantly (p < .01) related to 
social desirability (r = -.40, avoiding responses associated with 
socially undesirable responses), depression (r = .37), neuroticism 
(r = .50), anxiety (r = .41), and self-image (r = -.46), when data 
for males and females were analyzed together. When data for males 
and females were emalyzed separately, the only large difference 
related to significant (p < .01) correlations was with respect to 
self-concept and Avoidance. For females, the correlation between 
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self-concept and Avoidance was -.53, whereas for males this correla­
tion was -.40. Thus avoiding responses, as measured by this factor, 
and a poor self-concept are somewhat more closely related for females 
than for males. While all of the personality variables (depression, 
neuroticism, anxiety, and self-concept) correlated significantly 
(p < .01) and in the expected direction with Avoidance, there was 
partial confounding with social desirability, as well. 
With male and female data combined, no significant (p < .01) 
correlations were obtained between Perfectionism and any of the 
other variables. When data for each sex were analyzed separately, 
however, significant (p < .01) correlations were obtained between 
Perfectionism and class (r = -.24 for males, r = -.03 for females), 
and between Perfectionism eind marital status (r = -.23 for males, 
r = .03 for females). For males in this sample, the more advanced 
in school they were, the less likely they were to score highly on 
Perfectionism. Furthermore, single males in this sample tended to 
score higher on Perfectionism (i.e., they were more "perfection-
istic") than did male students who were not single. Perfectionism 
was not confounded with social desirability (r = .00 for males and 
females combined). 
When male and female data were analyzed together, significant 
(p < .01) correlations were found between Rationality-II (e.g., re­
sponsibility for one's own behavior, but not for others'; lack of 
judging) and the following variables: social desirability (r = .36, 
rational responses tending to be associated with socially desirable 
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responses), depression (r = -.18), neuroticism (r = -.15), and 
self-image (r = .19, rational responses tending to be associated 
with a good self-image). When males and females were analyzed in­
dividually, however, there was a significantly (p < .01) correlation 
between Rationality-II and anticipated experiences with psychologists 
or psychiatrists for men (r = -.23, irrational responses tending 
to be associated with not anticipating seeing a psychologist or 
psychiatrist), but not for women (r = .04). In addition, there 
was a significant (p < .01) correlation between Rationality-II and 
log family income for women (r = -.21, rational responses tending 
to be associated with lower log family income), but not for men 
(r = .00). Since Rationality-II is composed of items related to 
not judging, and being responsible for one's own behavior, but not 
others', it is indeed surprising that rational responses by men in 
this sample tend to be associated with anticipating seeing a 
psychologist or psychiatrist. Once again, however, caution is ad­
vised in interpreting this result, due to the limited nature of 
the scimple with respect to this variable. It is intriguing, though, 
that a higher family income for female students in this sample ap­
pears to be associated with irrationality (as measured by this fac­
tor). A final point, with respect to Rationality-II, is that this 
factor, too, is partially confounded with social desirability; in 
fact, the correlation between these two variables is higher than 
between Rationality-II and any of the other variables. 
Fear of failure is significantly (p < .01) correlated with 
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several variables, when male and female data are combined. These 
variables include: age (r = -.20, older students tending to be less 
afraid of failure), class (r = -=16), social desirability (r = -.27, 
fearful responses tending to be associated with socially undesirable 
responses), depression (r = .31), neuroticism (r = .57), anxiety 
(r = .31), and self-image (r = -.24, fearful responses tending to 
be associated with a poor self-image). Considerably different re­
sults, however, are obtained when males and females are considered 
separately. With females, for example, Fear of failure is signifi­
cantly (p < .01) correlated with age (r = -.23), class (r =-.24, 
students with more schooling tending to be less afraid of failure), 
marital status (r = -.20, single students tending to be more afraid 
of failure than students who are not single), social desirability 
(r = -.34), depression (r = .39), neuroticism (r = .63), anxiety 
(r = .32). and self-image (r = -.32). With males, however, only 
the variables of anxiety (r = .30) and neuroticism (r = .45) are 
significantly (p < .01) correlated with Fear of failure. Since 
Fear of failure is related to quite a few more variables for women 
in this sample than for men, it appears particularly important to 
examine the data independently for each sex, for this factor. 
To briefly summarize the relationships between the seven 
factors and the other variables included in the study, six of the 
seven factors (the seventh being Perfectionism) are significantly 
(p < .01) correlated with each of the personality variables. The 
only exception is that Rationality-II is not significantly (p < ,01) 
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related (r =-.06, for males and females combined) to anxiety. Fur­
thermore, although there are sex differences with respect to the cor­
relations between the factors aind the other variables, there are far 
more similarities between the sexes than there are differences. 
Five of the seven factors (Evaluating and Perfectionism being the 
exceptions) are partially confounded with social desirability. 
Correlations among the IBT, FBI, 
IVT, and other Variables 
In this section, the correlations among the original irra­
tionality instruments (IBT, FBI, and IVT), age, sex, class, marital 
status, experiences with psychologists and psychiatrists, the seven 
irrationality factors, social desirability, depression, anxiety, 
neuroticism, and self-image will be presented (see Table 16). These 
correlations are based upon the entire sample of 348 students. 
As hypothesized earlier (p. 30), the correlations between the 
three irrationality instruments were positive and significant (p < 
.01). The highest correlation was between the FBI and IVT (r = .65), 
and the lowest was between the IBT and IVT (r = .40). The FBI and 
IBT had a correlation of .62. 
The correlations between the three irrationality instruments 
and the four personality measures were also consistent with the 
hypothesis cited earlier (p. 30). These correlations were all sig­
nificant (p < .01), with irrational responses tending to be asso­
ciated with depression, neuroticism, sinxiety, and a low self-concept. 
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Table 16. Correlations among the IBT, FBI, IVT, and other 
variables (N = 348) 
IBT FBI IVT 
IBT 1.00 .62* 
*
 
o
 
FBI .62* 1.00 .65* 
IVT .40* .65* 1.00 
Age —. 12 -.13 -.16* 
Sex .04 -.08 1 b
 
0--
Class — .11 -.08 — .07 
Marital status -.06 -.12 -.11 
Past experiences with psych. .08 .01 .08 
Expected experiences with psych. -.09 -.11 -.14* 
Evaluating .^ * .78* .^ * 
Neuroticism .12* .85* .^ * 
Rationalitv-I -.m* 
-'21* -.JJ* 
Avoidance 
•Jâ* .37* 
Perfectionism •50* •34* 
Rationality-II 
81 1 -._05 
Fear of failure .w* .28* 
Social desirability -.45* -.30* 
IS 0
 1 
Depression .48* .51* .31* 
Neuroticism .61* .52* .27* 
Anxiety .47* .47* .31* 
Self-image -.43* -.48* -.32* 
•Significant, p < .01. 
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Correlations with the IVT, however, were not quite as high as with 
the PBI and IBT, for the personality measures. The IVT, though, 
was the only one of the three irrationality instruments not to be 
significantly (p > .05) related to social desirability. 
Since the seven factors were derived from the IBT, PBI, eind 
IVT, it is to be expected that the correlations between the factors 
and the original instruments would be rather high. This is pre­
cisely the case, with significant (p < .01) correlations having been 
found between each of the irrationality instruments and each of the 
seven factors. The only exception was that Rationality-11 correlated 
only-.06 with the PBI, and only-.05 with the IVT. The other cor­
relations ranged from .85, between the PBI and Neuroticism. to -.16, 
between the IVT and Rationality-I. 
In general, the IBT, PBI, and IVT did not relate very closely 
to age, sex, class, marital status, and experiences with psycholo­
gists and psychiatrists. There were two exceptions, however, which 
included; the IVT and age (r = -.16; significant, p< .01), and 
the IVT and anticipated experiences with psychologists or psychia­
trists (r = -.14; significant, p < .01). Specifically, irrational 
responses on the IVT tended to be associated with the expectation 
to visit a psychologist or psychiatrist in the near future, and 
younger students tended to give more irrational responses than did 
older students. The limitations of the sample with respect to the 
"experiences with psychologists or psychiatrists" questions have 
been discussed earlier. 
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In summary, the three irrationality instruments have been found 
to be significantly (p < .01) related to each other, and to measures 
of anxiety, neuroticism, depression, and self-concept. While the 
correlations with the personality measures are somewhat lower for 
the IVT, this was the only one of the three instruments not to be 
partially confounded with social desirability, and to be significantly 
(P < .01) associated with anticipating seeing a psychologist or 
psychiatrist in the near future. 
One-item Rating of Irrationality 
The one-item self-rating of irrationality ("In important situa­
tions, I think irrationally and become anxious or depressed.") was 
not found to be useful. This item did not load particularly highly 
on any of the seven factors. In addition, the item was not sig­
nificantly (p < .05) correlated with either the original irrationality 
instruments or with any of the seven factors derived from these in­
struments. 
Order Effects 
As mentioned earlier, three different orderings of the ques­
tionnaire booklet were employed in this study. The search for a 
fatigue or any other systematic order effect was accomplished by 
comparing item means axid standard deviations from each of the three 
forms, and by examining within-factor, within-=scale inter-item 
correlations of the irrationality items from each of the three 
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for Form 1 (where the IBT was first), next highest for Form 3 
(where the IBT was in the middle), and lowest for Form 2 (where 
the IBT was last). Examination of Table 18 reveals neither this 
pattern, nor any other consistent trends. 
Table 17. Means and standard deviations for the three orders 
Item^ Form 1^ Form 2° Form 3*^ 
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
1 72.45 88.89 50.58 96.84 98.55 80.18 
2 114.37 83.48 84.69 76.13 92.02 91.31 
3 18.86 89.39 -38.41 96.05 17.04 95.96 
4 25.44 74.91 13.47 67.11 22.23 81.07 
5 41.22 102.26 21.47 108.17 53.74 117.06 
96 12.02 119.91 17.39 98.55 26.55 116.75 
97 99.64 74.80 79.19 62.89 94.06 74.73 
98 5.62 107.17 0.77 96.21 19.72 102c19 
99 24.93 130.22 2.75 107.02 -10.69 118.39 
100 35.65 112.66 69.31 113.12 Ô8a42 118.90 
101 -123.54 100.61 -123.48 109.23 -85.54 118.43 
102 -58.80 117.26 -43.51 118.05 =32.82 111.03 
103 -125.16 79.58 -127.35 86.80 -121.13 86.35 
104 -14.71 109.56 -26.58 117.67 -15.07 119.33 
105 -20.34 108.62 -44.91 119.33 -16.24 115.75 
terns 1-100 are from Jones', 101-160 from Hartman's, and 
162-172 from MacDonald-Games• scale, 
bjones scale first, Hartman scale in the middle, MacDonald-
Games scale last. 
^Hartman scale first, MacDonale-Games scale in the middle, 
Jones scale last. 
•^MacDonald-Games scale first, Jones scale in the middle, 
Hartman's scale last. 
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Table 17. (continued) 
Item Form 1 Form 2 Form 3 
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
156 0.37 84.66 -3.96 91.32 5.44 88.46 
157 -103.24 83.47 -115.08 97.77 -112.53 110.98 
158 -22.82 109:87 -22.75 112.08 -7.03 119.27 
159 6.27 95.73 1.04 94.04 4.75 94.35 
160 -93.63 106.01 -114.34 102.83 -81.81 114.29 
162 -55.33 113.02 -108.76 114.03 -73.56 120.06 
163 -65.16 104.26 -90.08 101.37 -73.42 112.45 
164 -50.02 94.89 -50.13 89.27 -47.30 106.05 
165 -94.06 89.09 -90.29 86.98 -101.05 92.63 
166 -81.90 90.60 -69.15 78.49 -142.11 93.19 
168 -9.02 111.92 =25.45 115.22 2.44 129.45 
169 -54.71 101.67 -79.31 91.45 -68.58 101.72 
170 -30.66 100.22 2.53 103.00 13.70 115.64 
171 -17.28 32,73 -27.73 76.17 -35.43 97=71 
172 -116.79 88.06 -124.13 83.79 -141.19 92.34 
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Table 18. Within-factor, within-scale inter-item correlations 
Items" Form 1^ Form 2^ Form 3^ 
109,116 .36 .43 .53 
164,166 .23 .16 .10 
110,122 .12 -.10 .22 
117,158 .08 .10 .30 
151,157 .28 .29 .27 
149,156 .18 .46 .58 
157,134 .31 .10 .26 
146,135 .28 .20 .34 
16,36 .29 .28 .22 
36,31 .13 .00 .08 
31,15 .16 .00 .11 
15,4 .07 .28 .32 
7,27 .64 .53 .56 
28,17 — .06 -.01 .07 
37,6 = .0S ==06 .12 
^Items 1-100 are from Jones', 101-160 from Hartmaui's, and 
162-172 from MacDonald-Games' scale. 
bjones scale first, Hartman scale in the middle, MacDonald-
Games scale last. 
^Hartman scale first, MacDonald-Games scale in the middle, 
Jones scale last. 
<%acDonald-Games scale first, Jones scale in the middle, 
Hartman scale last. 
Table 18. (continued) 
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Items Form 1 Form 2 Form 3 
6,8 .20 .23 .12 
139,129 .28 .26 .50 
140,129 .35 .10 .52 
138,145 -.13 .07 .09 
139,145 -.05 .06 .00 
93,44 .12 .14 .09 
94.43 .17 .36 .21 
95,78 .03 .22 .17 
43.44 .29 .01 .24 
72,1 .40 .38 .32 
26.72 .43 .39 .31 
2,97 .02 .41 -.08 
71.73 .11 .20 .17 
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DISCUSSION 
There have been very few studies that have addressed the 
question of the effectiveness of RET. It was conjectured earlier 
that a major factor in this paucity of research has been the lack 
of an irrationality instrument with demonstrated reliability and 
validity. A similar argument can be voiced in criticism of those 
studies that have been completed in this area (e.g., Cavior & 
Cone, 1972). In other words, the value of a study concerning 
RET, in which a poor (or unknown) measure of irrationality has 
been employed, obviously is severely limited. 
The literature review of irrationality instruments discussed 
earlier reduced the number of promising inventories from eight to 
three, these three all being suitable for large-scale administra­
tion to an adult population. The Jones IBT, Hartman FBI, and 
MacDcnald^Gasies lYT were thus included in the present investiga­
tions The exploratory nature of this study led to the choice of 
factor analyzing all of the irrationality items from these, three 
instruments, rather than working with the scales as whole units. 
As well as providing far more detailed information concerning the 
content and internal consistency of the irrationality instruments, 
this procedure provided the possibility of using new combinations 
of good items from any of the three scales to measure irrationality. 
The theoretical writings of Albert Ellis (1962; Ellis & Harper, 
1961) suggested that neuroticism, anxiety, depression, and self-
concept are all directly related to irrationality. Previous 
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research (e.g., MacDonald & Games, 1972) has also suggested that 
there are sex differences with respect to irrationality. These 
variables, therefore, were all included in the present investiga­
tion of the measurement of irrationality. The results of comparing 
these variables with factors derived from the irrationality instru­
ments have been cited in the previous chapter. 
In the following three sections, the results of this study 
will be discussed in terms of the specific hypotheses outlined 
earlier (see p. 30). 
Hypothesis 1 
Hypothesis 1 was stated as follows: "Factor analyses of the 
irrationality instruments' items will yield ten factors that cor­
respond to Ellis' irrational beliefs; items representing a particular 
irrational idea will have the highest loadings for that particular 
factor; and factor loadings for specific items on each factor will 
be higher for items purporting to measure that factor, than for 
items purporting to measure another factor." 
This hypothesis, based primarily on Jones' (1968) comprehensive 
study concerning the IBT, was only partially confirmed. The factor 
analysis clearly does not support the Jones (1968) classification 
system of ten irrational ideas, corresponding to ten of Ellis' 
(1962) irrational beliefs. Ellis (1962), himself, has clearly 
stated that his irrational ideas "may be classified in various 
ways, so that the . . . listing is not meant to be definitive or 
non-overlapping, but constitutes one of several classificatory 
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approaches which may be taken to modern irrationalities" (p. 61). 
Jones (1968), however, found it necessary to "fit" his items, which 
were based upon a variety of Ellis' writings, to ten sub-scales that 
directly corresponded to ten of Ellis' ideas. The present factor 
analysis does not support Jones' contention that this is a valid 
approach (i.e., that the items from the IBT comprise ten separate 
factors, which conform to ten of Ellis' irrational beliefs). It 
appears that Jones would have been better advised to freely factor 
analyze his items, rather than forcing them to conform to a classi­
fication system that even its author admits was rather arbitrary. 
The fact that the present factor analysis suggests a somewhat 
different conceptualization of irrationality from the structure of 
the IBT, is not at all meant to suggest that these results are in­
consistent with Ellis' (1962) overall approach. On the contrary, 
the factors of Evaluating. Neuroticism. Rationality-I (e.g., lack 
of anxiety and acceptance of events philosophically), Avoidaince, 
Perfectionism, Rationality-II (e.g., responsibility for one's own 
behavior, but not for others'; lack of judging), and Fear of failure 
are entirely in agreement with RET principles. It is relevant at 
this point to consider the results of the factor analysis with 
respect to the items of the MacDonald-Games IVT (see APPENDIX D). 
The IVT actually consists of Ellis' (1962) eleven irrational state­
ments, and the items' factor loadings, therefore, are of particular 
interest. Tables 3 and 4 reveal that seven of the IVT items have 
high loadings (greater than .42) on Evaluating and Neuroticism, 
85 
Those items which did not load highly on any of the seven factors 
("One should be dependent on others and must have someone stronger 
on whom to rely;" "Past experiences and events are the determiners 
of present behavior; the influence of the past cannot be eradicated;" 
"One should be upset over people's problems and disturbances;" and 
"There is always a right or perfect solution to every problem, and 
it must be found or the results will be catastrophic") were similar 
in content to other items which did have higher loadings. All of 
the content, in fact, of the eleven irrational statements (Ellis, 
1962) can be observed in the seven factors. Furthermore, Evaluating, 
which accounts for the highest percentage of common variance in 
the seven factors (23.1%), is most obviously related to RET prin­
ciples. The emphasis within this factor on evaluating, blaming, 
and judging is most consistent with Ellis' writings, and it is not 
at all difficult to discern judging and blaming in the six irra­
tional beliefs (items 2-7 on the IVT) that load highly (greater 
than .42) on this factor. 
To summarize the findings with respect to the first hypothesis, 
then, the factor analysis did not support the use of ten factors 
corresponding to ten of Ellis' (1962) irrational beliefs. Hoivever» 
results did suggest a somewhat different conceptual framework for 
describing and measuring irrationality that was still consistent 
with RET principles. This conception of irrationality includes 
the seven factors; Evaluating, Neuroticism, Rationality-1, Avoid­
ance, Perfectionism, Rationality-II, and Fear of failure. Its 
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advantage over the previous conception of irrationality is that it 
is more empirically based. 
Hypothesis 2 
Hypothesis 2 was stated as follows: "Significant (p < .01) 
positive correlations between the different measures of irrationality 
will be found." The correlations between the IBT, PHI, and IVT 
were, in fact, both positive and significant (p < .01), ranging 
from .65 (PBI and IVT) to .40 (IBT eind IVT). However, since the 
factor analysis demonstrated that irrationality could be more 
meaningfully represented by seven new factors derived from the IBT, 
PBI, and IVT, the seven factors, rather than the three original 
scales, will be discussed below. As mentioned earlier, the inclusion 
of the one-item self-rating of irrationality did not prove to be 
rewarding. This item was not significantly (p > .05) correlated with 
the other measures of irrationality included in the study. There is 
no evidence, therefore, that the one-item rating measures irratio­
nality, as it has been defined by researchers in this area. 
Examination of Tables 3-9 reveals the following composition 
of the seven factors: Evaluating contains thirteen items from 
the PBI and two from the IVT; Neuroticism contains sixteen items 
from the PBI, three from the IBT, and one from the IVT; Rationality-
I contains five items from the IBT; Avoidance contains seven items 
from the IBT; Perfectionism contains five items from the PBI and 
one from the IBT; Rationality-II contains six items from the IBT; 
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and Fear of failure contains eight items from the IBT. Thus 
Rationality-I, Avoidance, Rationality-II, and Fear of failure are 
comprised entirely of IBT items, and Evaluating, Neuroticism, and 
Perfectionism contain items from more than one scale. 
The relationships between the seven factors will now be 
examined. Since Jones' (1968) finding that sex differences are 
important to components of irrationality was partially supported by 
the present findings (see Tables 12 and 13), the relationships be­
tween factors will be discussed separately for males and females. 
For males (see Table 12), Neuroticism correlated significantly 
(P < .01) with each of the other factors, except for Rationality-II, 
Rationality-II, in fact, was not found to be significemtly (p < .01) 
related to any of the other factors. Evaluating, on the other hand, 
was found to correlate significantly (p < .01) with Neuroticism and 
Perfectionism; Rationality-I correlated significantly (p < .01) 
with Neuroticism and Avoidance; Avoidance with Neuroticism, Rational­
ity-I, and Fear of failure; Perfectionism with Evaluating euid 
Neuroticism; and Fear of failure with Neuroticism and Avoidance, 
All of these significant (p < .01) correlations are entirely con­
sistent with RET. Each of the significant (p < .01) correlations 
between maladjustment-oriented factors (Evaluating, Neuroticism, 
Avoidance, Perfectionism, and Fear of failure) is positive (as 
reported in the previous chapter), while each of the correlations 
between the maladjustment-oriented factors and Rationality-I is 
negative. 
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For females (see Table 12), the relationships between factors 
were very different than they were for males, for Rationality-II 
and Fear of failure, respectively. Rationality-II, which for males 
was not significantly (p < .01) correlated with any of the other 
factors, had a correlation of .39 with Rationality-I (r = .04 for 
males). Fear of failure was significantly (p < .01) correlated 
with all of the other factors (positively), except for Rationality-
II. Thus for females, the two types of rationality measured by 
Factors 3 and 6 are far more closely associated with each other. 
than for males. Furthermore, Fear of failure was much more closely 
related to other aspects of irrationality for women in this sample, 
than for men. One possible conclusion from these results is that 
for women, the different aspects of irrationality (and rationality) 
may tend to be more directly related than for males. There is also 
the possibility, however, that females consistently self-disclose 
more, with respect to maladjustment or irrationality. It is generally 
accepted among personality theorists that females do self-disclose 
more readily than do males on a variety of measures (e.g., Pedersen 
& Breglio, 1968). 
To summarize the relationships between factors, there are a 
number of significant (p < .01) correlations between the factors, 
all of them consistent with RET. In addition, there are some 
differences in the way that the factors are associated, between 
males and females of this sample. The lack of significant (p < .01) 
relationships between certain factors (e.g.. Evaluating and 
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Rationality-II) is not necessarily contrary to RET principles, 
A general principle of RET is that if there is maladjustment, then 
there has probably been irrationality which has led to the malad­
justment. That is not to say, however, that if there is a particu­
lar type of irrationality, then a particular diagnosis of maladjust­
ment can be predicted. In fact, there is only one other study that 
even deals with components of irrationality (Jones, 1968). RET 
principles do not predict that different types of irrationality 
are necessarily associated with each other. It would be contrary 
to RET principles, however, if none of the irrationality factors 
were significantly (p < .01) correlated with a particular measure 
of maladjustment. This brings us to Hypothesis 3. 
Hypothesis 3 
Hypothesis 3 was stated as follows; "Significant (p < .05) 
correlations between each measure of irrationality and the measures 
of depression, anxiety, neuroticism, and low self-image will be 
obtained." The correlations between the IBT, FBI, IVT, and the 
personality measures were, in fact, significant (p < .01) and in 
the expected direction. The relationships between irrationality 
and depression, anxiety, neuroticism, and self-concept will be 
discussed below, with respect to the seven irrationality factors. 
Since there are some sex differences related to the factors, the 
correlations between the factors and the personality dimensions 
will be discussed separately for males and females. 
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It is apparent from the results illustrated in Tables 12 and 
13 that depression (as measured by the Depression Adjectives Check 
List) is significantly (p < .01) related to a number of the irra­
tionality factors. For males, evaluating responses, neurotic respon­
ses, irrational responses, and avoiding responses (Factors 1-4) are 
all associated with a tendency towards depression. For females, 
evaluating responses, neurotic responses, irrational responses, 
avoiding responses, and fearing failure responses (Factors 1-4, 6, 
and 7) are all associated with a tendency towards depression. Thus 
for both sexes, several of the irrationality factors have been found 
to be related to depression, 
Neuroticism (as measured by the Eysenck Personality Inventory) 
is also significantly (p < .01) related to a number of the irrational­
ity factors. For females, neurotic responses, irrational responses, 
avoiding responses, and fearing failure responses (Factors 2, 3, 4, 
and 7) are all related to a tendency towards neuroticism. For males, 
all of the directions of responding described above on Neuroticism, 
Rationality-I, Avoiding, and Fear of failure, with evaluating re­
sponses as well, are all related to a tendency towards neuroticism. 
Neuroticism, too, then has been found to be associated with several 
of the irrationality factors. 
Anxiety (as measured by the Fear Survey Schedule) was found 
to be related to the same irrationality factors, for both males 
and females. Anxiety tended to be associated with evaluating 
responses, neurotic responses, irrational responses, avoiding 
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responses, and fearing failure responses (Factors 1-4 and 7). 
Anxiety is the only one of the four personality variables of the study 
that was significantly (p < .01) correlated with the same factors, 
for both males and females. 
Self-concept (as measured by the Tennessee Self-Concept Scale), 
too, is significantly (p < .01) correlated with several of the ir­
rationality factors. For females, evaluating responses, neurotic 
responses, irrational responses, avoiding responses, and fearing 
failure responses (Factors 1-4, fb, and 7) are all associated with a. 
tendency towards a poor self-image. For males, evaluating responses, 
neurotic responses, and avoiding responses (Factors 1, 2, and 4) 
are associated with a tendency towards a poor self-concept. 
Each of the personality dimensions included in this study, 
then, is significantly (p < .01) correlated with at least three 
irrationality factors for males, aind at least four irrationality 
factors for females. This can be taken to be the beginning of 
validating evidence for six of the seven factors, and to a limited 
extent, as construct validity data for RET. The factor labeled 
Perfectionism, however, was not found to be significantly (p < .01) 
correlated with any of the personality variables. While it is 
possible that this component of irrationality is associated with 
the repression or denial of neurotic symptoms, and that it is, 
therefore, a valid component of irrationality, this is sheer 
speculation. Until some validating evidence is collected for 
this factor, its usefulness is seriously in doubt. 
92 
Demographic Variables and the Factors 
As has been frequently mentioned, the irrationality factors 
have been found to be related to sex in a variety of ways. Since 
these relationships have already been discussed in detail, with 
respect to both individual factors and correlations between factors 
and personality measures, the variable of sex will not be dis­
cussed further in this section, except in terms of how it relates 
to the other demographic variables and the irrationality factors. 
Information was collected with respect to the age, year in school, 
marital status, experiences with psychologists or psychiatrists, 
family income, and college gradepoint average of the Ss. Relation­
ships between each of these variables and the irrationality factors 
will now be discussed. 
The age of the Ss (see Tables 12 and 13) was found not to be 
significantly (p < =01) correlated with any of the irrationality 
factors, for males. For females, however, older Ss tended to 
report less evaluative responses (Factor 1) and less afraid of 
failure responses (Factor 7). Either females are learning to 
admit less irrationality information as they get older, or they 
are learning to be more rational in the two areas tapped by Eval­
uating and Fear of failure. 
There was enough variability in the sample, such that class 
(see Tables 12 and 13) or year in school, although related to age 
(r = «66 for females, r = .68 for males), was found to be related 
to the irrationality factors in a somewhat different fashion. 
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With females, being more advanced in college was associated with 
a tendency towards giving less afraid of failure responses (Fac­
tor 7). Once again, females appear to be progressing (or reveal­
ing less) when males are not, with respect to Fear of failure. 
For males, greater advancement in college is associated with 
less perfectionistic responses (Factor 5). This may be indicative 
of males learning something in college with respect to irrationality, 
too. Older and more advanced in school males, from this sample, do 
tend to be less neurotic (as measured by the Eysenck Personality 
Inventory). As reported earlier, however, there is not a signifi­
cant (p < .01) relationship between Perfcctionism and neuroticism. 
Marital status (see Tables 12 and 13) has been found to be 
related to Perfectionism, for males, and to Fear of failure, for 
females. In other words, single women tended to respond with 
greater fear of failure than did women in this sample who were 
not single, and single males tended to give more perfectionistic 
responses than did males in the sample who were not single. This 
suggests, of course, that marriage is associated with less perfec­
tionism in males, and less of a fear of failure in females. While 
these conclusions are consistent with the still prevalent notion 
in this culture that women who don't get married are "failures," 
and that men become more responsible and realistic after getting 
married, the limited nature of the sample (with respect to married 
students) and the confounding of the nonsingle category (married, 
divorced, and separated are all considered together) render these 
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conclusions highly speculative. This is particularly true with 
respect to Perfectionism, due to the lack of validating evidence 
from the personality measures for this factor. 
None of the irrationality factors or personality measures 
included in this study were found to correlate significantly 
(p < .01) with reports of experiences with psychologists or psychia­
trists. However, since this study is more concerned with present 
characteristics of Ss than past characteristics, this is not al­
together surprising. Anticipated experiences with psychologists 
or psychiatrists (See Tables 11 and 12) were found to be signifi­
cantly (p < .01) related to Neuroticism, for females, and to Ra-
tionality-II, for males. Specifically, neurotic responses, for fe­
males, tended to be associated with anticipating seeing a psycholo­
gist or psychiatrist. Anticipating seeing a psychologist or 
psychiatrist also tended to be associated with being depressed, 
neurotic, anxious, and having a poor self-concept. The rather 
bizarre finding that, for males, anticipating seeing a psychologist 
or psychiatrist in the near future tended to be related to rational 
responses (as measured by Rationality-II), is difficult to explain. 
One possibility is that this finding results from the item "I find 
it easy to seek advice," which is included in Rationality-II, al­
though in previous studies this item has been used to indicate 
irrationality. More likely, however, this finding is due to the 
limited nature of the sample, since only seventeen males and fe­
males in the entire sample responded affirmatively to the 
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"anticipated experience" question. 
Log family income (see Table 14) was found not be be signifi­
cantly (p < .01) correlated to any of the irrationality factors or 
personality measures, for males. For females, however, log family 
income correlated-.21 with Rationality-II. In other words, the 
lower the family income, the greater the tendency for females' 
responses to indicate responsibility for personal behavior and lack 
of judging (as measured by Rationality-II). 
Finally, college gradepoint average (see Table 13) was found 
not to be significantly (p < .01) correlated with any of the other 
variables in the study. This finding was consistent for both 
male and female S^s. 
Social Desirability and the Factors 
Social desirability is certainly one of the more important 
variables included in the present study. There is a very definite 
danger that in attempting to measure adjustment and other personal­
ity dimensions, that one is really measuring a tendency to respond 
in a socially desirable (or undesirable) fashion (Edwards, 1970). 
The Adult Irrational Ideas Inventory (Fox & Davies, 1971), dis­
cussed in detail earlier, is a good example. Cavior and Cone (1972) 
found that the All as a whole was correlated with two social de­
sirability scales at -.48 and =.45, respectively. Their principal com­
ponents factor analysis revealed, however, that the first factor 
(accounting for 11.7% of the total variance) was correlated with 
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the two social desirability scales at .80 and .83. The other 
factors were not interpretable, either in terms of RET or other 
personality terminology (Cavior & Cone, 1972). Similarly, a prin­
cipal components factor analysis of the MMPI (Edwards, 1970) re­
sulted in the SD scale having a loading of .97 on the first rotated 
factor (accounting for 38% of the total variance). These factors 
are measuring social desirability, not irrationality or maladjust­
ment (Cavior & Cone, 1972; Edwards, 1970). 
While social desirability is at least partially confounded 
with five of the seven factors in this investigation, the situation 
is not as severe as those described above. Evaluating and Per­
fectionism, for example, are not even significantly (p < .01) cor­
related with social desirability, with male and female data viewed 
either separately or together. Since social desirability and sex 
are significantly (p < .01) correlated (r = .16, females tending 
to give more socially desirable responses), the relationships 
between social desirability and the other five factors will be 
discussed separately for males and for females. 
For females, correlations between social desirability and 
Meuroticism, Rationality-I, Avoidance, Rationality-IIj and Feajr 
of failure are -.47, .36, -.46, .37, and -.34, respectively. 
For males, social desirability is significantly (p < .01) correlated 
only with Neuroticism (r = -.39), Avoidance (r = -.34), and Rational-
ity-II (r = .34). While it might be better if some of these cor­
relations were lower, it certainly cannot be argued very effectively 
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that any of the seven factors is predominantly measuring social 
desirability. One final comparison that may be useful, is that two 
of the scales of the Edwards Personal Preference Schedule (Edwards, 
1959), an instrument designed to keep social desirability confounding 
at a minimum, have correlations with social desirability between .30 
and .35. It does not seem necessary, therefore, to discount any of 
the seven irrationality factors solely on the basis of confounding 
with social desirability. 
Conclusions 
The present investigation has suggested that the ten (or 
eleven) irrational ideas of Albert Ellis (1962) are not appropriate 
as a basis for ten subscales measuring irrationality. While Ellis' 
(1962) conceptualization of irrationality has been extremely useful 
in providing a specific and widely known definition of irrationality, 
previous researchers (e.g., Jones, 1968) have sometimes followed 
Ellis' arbitrary classification system of modern irrationalities 
too rigidly, i.e., without first investigating empirically what the 
components of irrationality are. 
The three irrationality instruments employed in this study 
(Jones' IBT, Hartman's PBI, and MacDonald-Games' IVT), suggested 
by previous research to be the most promising were all based 
upon Ellis' (1962) conceptualization of irrationality. How­
ever, these instruments are not comprised of ten or eleven 
factors that correspond to Ellis formulation. 
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Furthermore, these instruments are not comprised of a single "ir­
rationality" factor. Instead, a new framework for measuring and 
landerstanding irrationality, still consistent with RET principles, 
is suggested. The seven factors that this framework consists of 
include; Evaluating (blaming, judging, and dependency); Neuroticism 
(anxiety and insecurity); Rationality-I (acceptance of events philo­
sophically, and the absence of anxiety); Rationality-II (nonjudging 
and responsibility for personal behavior); Avoidance; Perfectionism; 
and Fear of failure. These factors have been found, with one ex­
ception (Perfectionism), to be significantly (p < .01) related to 
measures of depression, neuroticism, anxiety, and self-image, con­
sistent with predictions derived from the RET literature. The dis­
criminant reliabilities of the seven factors, ranging from .91 
(Neuroticism) to ,56 (Rationality-I), could, of course, be in­
creased by adding further items. 
The differences in the relationships between the factors and 
the personality measures, when male and female data were viewed 
separately, once again demonstrated the advantage of examining 
personality data separately for males and females. It is not pos­
sible, however, from the results of this study, to determine whether 
there are any clearcut personality (or cognitive style) differences 
between the sexes, with respect to irrationality, or if the dis­
crepancies can be traced to differences in what males and females 
will admit about themselves on a paper-and-pencil personality 
inventoryo As mentioned earlier, social desirability and sex were 
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found to be significantly (p < .01) correlated for this sample, 
with females tending to give more socially desirable responses 
than did males. Furthermore, other researchers have demonstrated 
sex differences with respect to personality correlates of self-
disclosure (e.g., Pedersen & Breglio, 1968). 
The above discussion concerning what is "really" being 
measured brings up some crucial questions regarding the measure­
ment of irrationality by paper-and-pencil inventories. Irrational­
ity is an exceedingly difficult construct to measure. Although it 
was argued earlier that having people respond to questions concern­
ing the extent to which they believe in various ideas (as a measure 
of the cognitive variable of irrationality) was more direct than 
other forms of personality measurement, there are some severe prob­
lems inherent in this approach. Nunnally (1967) has pointed out 
the necessity of using unambiguous, uni-dimensional items in con­
structing tests, in order to facilitate high reliability and in­
ternal consistency. This is an especially difficult task to ac­
complish for irrationality, when the investigator is interested 
in multi-dimensional cognitive beliefs, eind not symptoms. For 
example, the item "People are disturbed not by situations, but by 
the view they take of them" is really composed of two parts: 
people are not disturbed by situations and people are upset by the 
view that they take of situations. Neither of these two segments 
independently can properly match the meaning of the original with respect 
to irrationality. Previous researchers, therefore, have accepted 
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the notion that irrationality is a complex variable that requires 
multi-dimensional items. This has unfortunately resulted, how­
ever, in a great deal of ambiguity, and a tremendous amount of 
variability in response to the same or similar items» 
This issue of the complexity of items could conceivably be 
solved by researchers particularly adept at writing items and test 
construction. An even more basic dilemma, though, is what respon­
dents are writing about when they are asked about their irrational 
beliefs. As William James (1902) explained so eloquently almost 
three-quarters of a century ago, there is a huge difference be­
tween "core" beliefs (or belief systems) and "peripheral" beliefs. 
The former frequently and influentially energize or motivate an 
individual's behavior, while the latter are accepted but do not 
really affect the person very much. When an individual is asked on 
a paper-and-pencil test about agreement or disagreement with various 
ideas and statements^ there is no evidence that the person will 
respond differentially to questions that concern core and peripheral 
beliefs. Thus there is not much reason to expect that data collected 
from such inventories are likely to be very closely associated with 
the individual's behavior (overt or covert), A clinician has the 
advantage of being able to ask more questions to find out how in= 
fluential various beliefs are, as well as the added possibility 
of additional information in the form of voice quality and non­
verbal communication; the paper-and-pencil test has no such pos­
sibilities, Therefore, it is suggested that irrationality 
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instruments are unlikely to become useful as clinical tools for 
individual clients. They may become useful, however, and to a 
certain extent already have become useful, for research purposes. 
It seems appropriate, then, to conclude with a brief discussion 
of the implications of the present study for future research. 
Future Research 
The first stage in the application of the present study's 
results would be a replication of the factor analysis of items 
from the IBT, PBI, and IVT. A change in the conceptualization 
and measurement of irrationality obviously ought not to be based 
upon just one study. It is suggested that this replication be 
carried out with a nonstudent population, in order to increase the 
generalizability of the findings. In this way, a reliable set of 
factors that represent the RET concept of irrationality can be 
obtained. If this procedure is not productive, in that either 
reliable (and meaningful) factors cannot be derived from these 
instruments, or not enough items from the IBT, PBI, and IVT load 
high enough on the factors to comprise a new instrument, then it 
is suggested that new items be written based upon Ellis' (1962) 
irrational beliefs or the new irrationality factors. In working 
on any new items, particular attention ought to be given to writing 
uni-dimensional items, and to balancing scales with respect to social 
desirability. 
The next step concerning research in this area would be to 
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investigate further the relationships between the new irrationality 
instrument and other personality variables (e.g., depression, neuroti-
cism, anxiety, and self-image). Any irrationality scale or factor 
which does not correlate significantly with some other measure of 
maladjustment probably should be considered to be useless. It might 
be helpful in studies of this type to include general clinical 
ratings of adjustment, along with the paper-and-pencil measures. 
In the present study, the factor of Perfectionism was not found to 
be related to any of the other personality instruments. It was not 
possible to determine whether Perfectionism was not a useful factor, 
or whether people who score highly on this factor are just less 
likely to admit to traditional maladjustment symptoms. The inclu­
sion of clinical ratings of Ss' adjustment might give additional 
information in this regard. 
After accomplishing the research tasks described above, it would 
then be possible to use the new irrationality dimensions to help 
measure the effectiveness of RET. For example, investigations could 
be carried out concerning what kinds of irrationality were most 
likely to be reduced or eliminated by RET. In addition, RET could 
be compared with other therapies to determine further its differen­
tial effect on irrationality. The usefulness of RET in nonclinical 
settings could also be studied. For example, the effect of teaching 
RET principles in school environments could be tested for various 
age groups. If Ellis (1962) is correct in his claim that irrational­
ity is a general cultural phenomenon, then the uses of a reliable 
and valid measure of irrationality would be virtually endless. 
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APPENDIX A; BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
General Information 
This first section of the questionnaire consists of questions about 
your general background. Write your answer to each question in the 
space provided. 
Present age? 
Sex (Male or Female)? 
Occupation or classification in school 
(Freshman, Sophomore, Junior, or Senior)? 
Firm of school? 
_____ Present annual salary (or parents' salary if student)? 
_____ Marital status (single, married, separated, or divorced)? 
The highest educational level that I attained was: 
A. Did not graduate from high school. 
B. High school graduate. 
C. Two years of college or less. 
D. More than two years of college but did not graduate. 
E. College graduate;. 
F. Master's degree or higher. 
If a student, what is your cumulative gradepoint average? 
______________________ Have you ever seen a psychologist or 
psychiatrist professionally? If so, 
for how long? 
Do you anticipate seeing a psychologist or psychiatrist 
in the near future? 
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APPENDIX B; PERSONAL BELIEFS INVENTORY 
Instructions; This is an inventory about the way that you believe 
and feel about various things. There are a number of statements 
with which you will tend to agree or disagree. For each statement 
you should mark your answer in the space provided as follows—ac­
cording to your own reaction to the item: 
Use a number from 1 to 99, You may use any number from 1 to 99 to 
indicate your response to a statement. This does not mean that you 
have to use all the numbers from 1 to 99. Some people use only the 
numbers 1, 25, 50, 75, and 99. Others use 1, 10, 20, 30, 40, ..., 
up to 99. The point is, the distinction you maJce should be as fine 
as you can make. Use the numbers along the range you feel most 
comfortable with. If you feel you can distinguish between 50 and 51, 
then do so. This procedure satisfies some people's need to make 
fine distinctions, but others who feel they cannot respond with such 
precision may use fewer different numbers. 
When making your judgment concerning whether you agree or disagree 
with each statement, place a number from 1 to 99 in the space fol­
lowing each statement. Answer "1" to those statements you "com­
pletely disagree" with and answer "99" to those statements you 
"completely agree" with. Answer with numbers between "1" and "99" 
those statements which you neither completely agree or completely 
disagree with. The closer your response is to "99" the more you 
agree with the statement. The closer your response is to "1" the 
more you disagree with the statement. The closer your response is 
to "50" the more uncertain you are about your reaction. Thus a 
response of "50" indicates that you neither agree nor disagree with 
the particular statement. 
When responding to each statement according to whether you agree or 
disagree with it, use the following scale: 
1 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 99 
COMPLETELY 
DISAGREE 
It is not necessary to think over any item very long. Mark your 
answer quickly and go on to the next statement. 
Be sure to mark how you actually feel about the statement; not how 
you think you should feel. 
NEUTRAL OK 
UNCERTAIN AGREE 
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Instructions; For each of the following statements mark a number 
from 1-99, according to your reaction to the item, in the space after 
each statement. 
It is not necessary to think about any item for very long. Mark your 
answer quickly and go on to the next statement. 
Be sure to mark how you actually feel about the statement, not how 
you think you should feel. 
Use the following scale to answer the next series of questions: 
1 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 99 
COMPLETELY NEUTRAL OR COMPLETELY 
DISAGREE UNCERTAIN AGREE 
1. An adult must be approved of or loved by everyone for 
everything he or she does. 
2. What others think of you is most important. 
3. Depending on others is better than depending on 
oneself. 
4. A person should be thoroughly competent, adequate, 
talented, and intelligent in all possible respects. 
5. The main goal and purpose of life is achievement and 
success. 
6. Incompetence in anything whatsoever is an indication 
that a person is inadequate or valueless. 
7. One should blame oneself severely for all mistakes and 
wrongdoings. 
8. Punishing oneself for all errors will help prevent 
future mistakes. 
9. A person should blame others for their mistaken or 
bad behavior. 
10. One should spend considerable time and energy trying 
to reform others. 
11. One can best help others by criticizing tiiem and 
sharply pointing out the error of their ways, 
12. It is natural to get upset by the errors and 
stupidities of others. 
13. Because a certain thing once strongly affected one's 
life, it should indefinitely affect it. 
14. Because a person was once weak and helpless, one 
must always remain so. 
15. Because parents or society taught acceptance of certain 
traditions, one must go on accepting these traditions. 
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1 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 99 
COMPLETELY NEUTRAL OR œMPLETELY 
DISAGREE UNCERTAIN AGREE 
16. If things are not the way one would like them to be, it 
is a catastrophe. 
17. Other people should make things easier for us, and help 
with life's difficulties. _____ 
18. No one should have to put off present pleasures for 
future gains. 
19. Avoiding life's difficulties and self-responsibilities 
is easier than facing them. ______ 
20. Inertia and inaction are necessary and/or pleasant. _____ 
21. One should rebel against doing things, however 
necessary, if doing them is unpleasant= _ 
22. Unhappiness is externally caused or created by out­
side persons smd events. ______ 
23. A person has no control over his or her emotions and 
cannot help feeling bad on many occasions. _____ 
24. If something is or may be dangerous or injurious, one 
should be concerned about it. 
25. Worrying about a possible danger will help ward it off 
or decrease its effect. ______ 
25. Certain people are bad, wicked, or villainous and 
should be blamed and punished for their sins. _____ 
27. Maximum human happiness can be achieved by passively 
and uncommittedly "enjoying oneself." ______ 
28. Any job should be done perfectly and thoroughly if 
you do it at all. _____ 
29. People should observe moral laws more strictly than 
they do. ______ 
30. I get annoyed at being held up by small rules and 
regulations, ______ 
31. I get impatient, and begin to fume and fret, when 
people delay me unnecessarily. _____ 
32. When I'm in a group, I'm always afraid I may say or do 
something foolish, 
33. If you once start doing favors for people, they may 
just walk all over you. _____ 
34. I tend to do or say things I later hate myself for. _____ 
35. When things go badly, I tend to blame myself. _____ 
36. I feel that many people could be described as 
victims of circumstances beyond their control. _____ 
37. The trouble with many people is that they don't 
take things seriously. ______ 
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1 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 99 
COMPLETELY NEUTRAL OR COMPLETELY 
DISAGREE UNCERTAIN AGREE 
38. For most questions there is one right answer, once a 
person has the facts. 
39. People today have forgotten how to feel properly 
ashamed of themselves. _____ 
40. I set a high standard for myself and feel others 
should do the same. 
41. Criticism makes me nervous and anxious. ______ 
42. I do whatever makes me feel good at the moment, even 
at the cost of some distant goal. _____ 
43. I am so touchy on some subjects that I can't talk 
about them. 
44. A large number of people are guilty of bad sexual 
conduct. _____ 
45. Some of my family and/or friends have habits that 
bother and annoy me. _____ 
46. My feelings are easily hurt. 
47. I feel self-conscious and uncomfortable when in the 
presence of those whom I consider to be my superiors. _____ 
48. I worry over possible misfortunes. _____ 
49. At times I think I am no good at all. _____ 
50. I get excited or upset when things go wrong, _____ 
51. I shrink from facing a crisis or difficulty. _____ 
52= I have reason for feeling jealous of one or more 
members of my family. _____ 
53. It makes me aingry or upset when other people interfere 
with my daily activity. 
54. I become depressed because of my own deficiencies 
or shortcomings. 
55. I feel guilty because of the sins I have committed. _____ 
56. I tend to become upset and miserable when things are 
not the way I would like them to be. _____ 
57. There is invariably a right, precise, and perfect 
solution to humian problems, and it is catastrophic 
when this perfect solution isn't found. _____ 
58. You owe obedience to your parents just because 
they are your parents. _____ 
59. I tend to take myself and others too seriously. _____ 
60. It is realistic to expect that there should be no 
incompatibility in marriage. _____ 
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APPENDIX C; IRRATIONAL BELIEFS TEST 
1 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 99 
COMPLETELY NEUTRAL OR œMPLETELY 
DISAGREE UNCERTAIN AGREE 
lo It is important to me that others approve of me. ______ 
2. I hate to fail at anything, 
3. People who do wrong deserve what they get. _____ 
4. I accept what happens philosophically. ______ 
5. If a person wants to, he or she can be happy under 
any circumstances. ______ 
6. I have a fear of some things that bother me. ______ 
7. I put off important decisions. _____ 
8. Everyone needs someone he or she can depend on for 
help and advice, ______ 
9. "A zebra cannot change its stripes," _____ 
10, There is a right way to do everything, ______ 
11, I like the respect of others, but I don't have to 
have it. 
12, I avoid things I cannot do well. _______ 
13, Evil persons escape the punishment they deserve. ______ 
14, Frustrations don't upset me. __________ 
15, People are disturbed not by situations, but by the 
view they take of them. _______ 
16, I feel no anxiety over unexpected dangers or future 
events. 
17, I try to go aOiead and get irksome tasks behind me 
when they come up, 
18, I try to consult an authority on important decisions, _______ 
19, It is impossible to overcome the influences of the 
past, ______ 
20, There is no perfect solution to anything, _________ 
21, I want everyone to like me, 
22, I don't mind competing in activities where others are 
better than I, _______ 
23, Those who do wrong deserve to be blamed, ______ 
24, Things should be different from the way they are, ______ 
25, I cause ray own moods. ______ 
26, I can't get my mind off some concerns. ______ 
27, I avoid facing my problems. 
28, People need a source of strength outside themselves. _____ 
29, Just because something once strongly affects your 
life, doesn't mean it need do so in the future. 
116 
1 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 99 
COMPLETELY NEUTRAL OR COMPLETELY 
DISAGREE UNCERTAIN AGREE 
30. There are no easy ways out of life's difficulties. 
31. I can like myself even when many others don't. 
32. I like to succeed at something, but I don't feel I 
have to. 
33. Immorality should be strongly punished. 
34. I get disturbed over situations I don't like. 
35. People who are miserable have made themselves 
that way. 
36. If I can't keep something from happening, I don't 
worry about it. 
37. I make decisions as promptly as I can. 
38. There are certain people that I depend on greatly. 
39. People overvalue the influence of the past. 
40. Some problems will always be with us. 
41. If others dislike one, that's their problem not mine. 
42. It is important to me to be successful in everything 
I do. 
43. I never blame people for their wrongdoings. 
44. I accept things the way they are, even if I don't 
like them. 
45. A person won't stay angry or blue long unless one 
keeps oneself that way. 
46. I can't stand to take chances= 
47. Life is too short to spend it doing unpleasant tasks. 
48. I like to stand on ray own two feet. 
49. If I had had different experiences, I could be more 
like I want to be. 
50. Every problem has a correct solution. 
51. I find it hard to go against what others think. 
52. I enjoy activities for their own sake, no matter how 
good I am at them. 
53. The fear of punishment helps people be good. 
54. If things annoy me, I just ignore them. 
55. The more problems a person has, the less happy he or 
she will be. 
56. I am never anxious over the future. 
57. I never put things off. 
58. I am the only one who can really understand and face 
my problems. 
59. I never think of past experiences as affecting me now. 
60. We live in a world of chance and probability. 
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1 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 99 
COMPIXTELY NEUTRAL OR COMPLETELY 
DISAGREE UNCERTAIN AGREE 
61. Although I like approval, it is not a real need for me. 
62. It bothers me when others are better than I am at 
something. _______ 
63. Everyone is basically good. ______ 
64. I do what I can to get what I want, and then don't 
worry about it. _______ 
65. Nothing is upsetting in itself—only in the way you 
interpret it, • 
66. I worry about certain things in the future. 
67. It is difficult for me to do unpleasant chores. ______ 
68. I dislike for others to make my decisions for me. ________ 
69. We are slaves to our personal histories. _______ 
70. There is never an ideal solution to anything. ______ 
71. I worry about how much people approve of and accept me. _____ 
12, It upsets me to make mistakes. _____ 
73. It's unfair that "the rain falls on both the just and 
the unjust." _____ 
74. I am fairly easy going about life. _____ 
75. More people should face up to the unpleasantness of 
life. 
76. I can't get fears off of my mind. 
77. A life of ease is not very rewarding. ______ 
78. I find it easy to seek advice- _____ 
79. Once something strongly affects your life, it 
always will. ______ 
80. It is better to look for a practical solution than 
a perfect one. ______ 
81. I have concern with what people are feeling about me. ______ 
82. I become annoyed over little things. _____ 
83. I give someone who has annoyed me a second chance. _____ 
84. I dislike responsibility. _____ 
85. There is never any reason to remain sorrowful for 
very long. ______ 
86. I never thinlc of such things as death or atomic war. ______ 
87. People aire happiest when they have challenges and 
problems to overcome. ______ 
88. I dislike having to depend upon others. _____ 
89. People never change basically, _».=== 
90. I feel I must hamdle things in the right way. 
91. It is annoying, but not upsetting, to be criticized, _____ 
92. I'm not afraid to do things that I cannot do well. _____ 
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1 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 99 
COMPLETELY NEUTRAL OR COMPLETELY 
DISAGREE UNCERTAIN AGREE 
93. No one is evil even though his or her deeds may be. 
94. I do not become upset over the mistakes of others. 
95. People make their own hell within themselves. ________ 
96. I find myself planning what I would do in different 
dangerous situations. 
97. If something is necessary, I do it even if it is 
unpleasant. 
98. I've learned not to expect someone else to be con­
cerned about my welfare. _______ 
99. I don't look upon the past with any regrets. _______ 
100. There is no such thing as an ideal set of 
circumstances. 
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APPENDIX D: IRRATIONAL VALUES TEST 
Instructions; For each of the following statements mark a number 
from 1-99, according to your reaction to the item, in the space 
after each statement. 
It is not necessary to think about any item for very long. Mark 
your answer quickly and go on to the next statement. 
Be sure to mark how you actually feel about the statement, not how 
you think you should feel. 
Using the following scale to answer the next twelve questions: 
1 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 99 
COMPLETELY NEUTRAL OR COMPLETELY 
DISAGREE UNCERTAIN AGREE 
1. It is essential that one be loved or approved by 
virtually everyone in his or her community. 
2. One must be perfectly competent, adequate, and 
achieving to consider oneself worthwhile, 
3. Some people are bad, villainous, or wicked and 
therefore should be blamed or punished. 
4- It is a terrible catastrophe when things are not 
as one wants them to be. 
5. Unhappiness is caused by outside circumstances, and 
the individual has no control over it. 
6. Dangerous or fearsome things are causes for great 
concern, and their possibility must be continually 
dwelt upon. 
7. It is easier to avoid certain difficulties and self-
responsibilities than to face them. 
6, One should be dependent on others and must have 
someone stronger on whom to rely. 
9. Past experiences and events are the determiners of 
present behavior; the influence of the past cannot 
be eradicated. 
10. One should be upset over people's problems and 
disturbances. 
,11. There is always a right or perfect solution to every 
problem, and it must be found or the results will 
be catastrophic. 
PLEASE NOTE: 
Pages 120-121, Appendix E, "Marlowe-
Crowne Social Desirability Scale", 
and pages 127-129, Appendix H, 
"Eysenck Personality Inventory", 
copyrighted material, not microfilmed 
at request of author. Available for 
consultation at Iowa State University 
Library. 
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APPENDIX F; DEPRESSION ADJECTIVES CHECK LIST 
Instructions; Below you will find words which describe different 
kinds of moods and feelings. If "1" represents "completely in­
accurate" and "99" represents "completely accurate," use a number 
from 1-99 to respond to each word as to whether it accurately 
describes how you feel right now—today. 
Work rapidly and respond to each item. Be sure to mark how you 
actually feel, not how you think you should feel. 
Use the following scale to answer this group of items; 
1 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 99 
COMPLETELY UNCERTAIN COMPLETELY 
INACCURATE ACCURATE 
1. Wilted 
2. Safe 
3. Miserable 
4. Gloomy 
5. Dull 
6. Happy 
7. Low-spirited 
S. Sad 
9. Unwanted 
10. Fine 
11. Broken-hearted 
12. Down-cast 
13. Enthusiastic 
14. Failure 
15. Afflicted 
16. Active 
17. Strong 
18. Tortured 
19. Listless 
20. Sunny 
21. Destroyed 
22. Wretched 
23. Broken 
24. Light-hearted 
25. Criticized 
26. Grieved 
27. Dreamy 
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1 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 99 
COMPLETELY UNCERTAIN COMPLETELY 
INACCURATE ACCURATE 
28. Hopeless 
29. Oppressed 
30. Joyous 
31. Weary 
32. Droopy 
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APPENDIX G; FEAR SURVEY SCHEDULE 
Instructions; The next group of items refer to experiences and 
things that may cause fear or other unpleasant feelings. If "1" 
represents "not at all afraid" and "99" represents "very much 
afraid," record a number from 1-99 for each item that describes 
how you are disturbed by it nowadays. 
It is not necessary to think over any item very long. Mark your 
answer quickly and go on to the next item. 
Be sure to mark how you actually feel, not how you think you should 
feel. 
Use the following scale for the next series of items; 
1 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 99 
NOT AT ALL SOMEWHAT VERY MUCH 
AFRAID AFRAID AFRAID 
1. Noise of vacuum clearner 
2. Open wound 
3. Being alone 
4. Being in a strange place 
5. Loud voices 
6^ Dead people 
7. Speaking in public 
8. Crossing streets 
9o People who seem insane 
10, Falling 
11, Automobiles 
12, Being teased 
13, Dentists 
14, Thunder 
15= Sirens 
16. Failure 
17. Entering a room when other people are already seated 
18. High places on land 
19. People with deformities 
20. Worms 
21. Imaginary creatures 
22. Receiving injections 
23. Strangers 
24o Bats 
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1 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 99 
NOT AT ALL SOMEWHAT VERY MUCH 
AFRAID AFRAID AFRAID 
25. Journeys by train 
26. Journeys by bus 
27. Journeys by car 
28. Feeling angry 
29. People in authority 
30. Flying insects 
31. Seeing other people injected 
32. Sudden noises 
33. Dull weather 
34. Crowds 
35. Large open spaces 
36. Cats 
37. One person bullying another 
38. Tough-looking people 
39. Birds 
40. Sight of deep water 
41. Being watched working 
42. Dead animals 
43. Weapons 
44. Dirt 
45. Crawling insects 
46. Sight of fighting 
47- Uolv ûeopls 
48. Fire ' 
49. Sick people 
50. Dogs 
51. Being criticized 
52. Strange shapes 
53. Being in an elevator 
54. Witnessing surgical operations 
55. Angry people 
56. Mice 
57. Human blood 
58. Animal blood 
59. Parting from friends 
60. Prospect of a surgical operation 
61. Feeling rejected by others 
62. Airplanes 
63. Medical odors 
64o Feeling disapproved of 
65. Harmless snakes 
66. Cemeteries 
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1 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 99 
NOT AT ALL SOMEWHAT VERY MUCH 
AFRAID AFRAID AFRAID 
67. Being ignored ______ 
68. Darkness _____ 
69. Premature heart beats or missing a beat _____ 
70. Nude men _____ 
71. Nude women ______ 
72. Lightning _____ 
73. Doctors _____ 
74. Enclosed places _____ 
75. Making mistakes _____ 
76. Looking foolish ______ 
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APPENDIX I; TENNESSEE SELF-œNCEPT SCALE 
Instructions; The following statements are to help you describe 
yourself as you see yourself. Please respond to them as if you 
were describing yourself yourself. Do not omit any items t 
Read each statement carefully; then respond from 1-99 where "1" 
means "completely false" and "99" meeins "completely true." 
It is not necessary to think over any item for very long. Mark your 
answer quickly and go on to the next statement. 
When responding to each statement according to whether it is true 
or false, use the following scale: 
1 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 99 
COMPLETELY UNCERTAIN COMPLETELY 
FALSE TRUE 
1. I have a healthy body. 
2. I am em attractive person. 
3. I consider myself a sloppy person. 
4. I am a decent sort of person. 
5. I am an honest person. 
6. I am a bad person. 
7. I am a cheerful person. 
8e I am a calm and easy-going person. 
9. I am a nobody. 
IDs I have a family that would help me in any kind of 
trouble. 
11. I am a member of a happy family. 
12. My friends have no confidence in me. 
13. I am a friendly person. 
14. I asi populsuT with msn. 
15. I am not interested in what other people do. 
16. I do not always tell the truth. 
17. I get ahgry. 
18. I like to look nice and neat. 
19. I am full of aches and pains. 
20. I am a sick person. 
21. I am a religious person. 
22. I am a moral failure. 
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1 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 99 
COMPLETELY UNCERTAIN COMPLETELY 
FALSE TRUE 
23. I am a morally weak person. 
24. I have self-control. 
25. I am a hateful person. 
26. I am losing my mind. 
27. I am an important person to my friends and family. 
28. I am not loved by my family. 
29. I feel that my family doesn't trust me. 
30. I am popular with women. 
31. I am mad at the whole world. 
32. I am hard to be friendly with. 
33. I think of things too bad to talk about. 
34. When I'm not feeling well, I can be cross. 
35. I am neither too fat nor too thin. 
36. I like my looks just the way they are. 
37. I would like to change my body. 
38. I am satisfied with my moral behavior. 
39. I am satisfied with my relationship with God. 
40. I ought to go to church more. 
41. I am satisfied to be just what I am. 
42. I am just as nice as I should be. 
43. I despise myself. 
44. I am satisfied with my family relationships. 
45. I understand my family as well as I should. 
46. I should trust my family more. 
47. I am as sociable as I want to be. 
48. I try to please others, but I don't overdo it, 
49. I am no good at all from a social standpoint, 
50. I do not like everyone I know. 
51. I can laugh at dirty jokes. 
52. I am neither too tall nor too short. 
53. I don't feel as well as I should. 
54. I should have more sex appeal. 
55. I am as religious as I want to be. 
56. I wish I could be more trustworthy. 
57. I shouldn't tell so many lies. 
58. I am as smart as I want to be. 
59. I am not the person I would like to be. 
60. I wish I didn't give up as easily as I do. 
61. I treat my parents as well as I should. (Use 
past tense if parents are not living) 
62. I am too sensitive to things my family say. 
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63. I should love my family more. 
64. I am satisfied with the way I treat other people. 
65. I should be more polite with others. 
66. I ought to get along better with other people. 
67. I gossip. 
68. I have felt like swearing. 
69. I take good care of myself physically. 
70. I try to be careful about my appearance. 
71. I act like I'm all thumbs. 
72. I am true to my religion in my everyday life. 
73. I try to change when I know that I'm doing things that 
are wrong. 
74. I have done very bad things. 
75. I can take care of myself in any situation. 
76. I take the blame for things without getting mad. 
77. I do things without thinking about them first. 
78. I try to play fair with my friends and family. 
79. I take a real interest in my family. 
80. I give in to my parents (Use past tense if parents 
are not living). 
81. I try to understamd the other person's point of view. 
82. I get along well with other people. 
83. I do not forgive others easily. 
84. I would rather win than lose in a game. 
85. I usually feel good. 
86. I do poorly in sports and games. 
87. I am a poor sleeper. 
88. I do what is right. 
89. I have used unfair means to get ahead. 
90. I have trouble doing the things that are right. 
91. I solve my problems easily, 
92. I change my mind. 
93. I try to run away from my problems, 
94. I do my share of work at home. 
95. I quarrel with my family. 
96. I do not act like my family thinks I should. 
97. I see good points in all the people I meet. 
98. I do not feel at ease with other people, 
99. I find it hard to talk with strangers, 
100. I have put off until tomorrow what I ought to do today« 
